









The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 






















THE FORMULATION OF A COHERENT SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH TO 
THE CLASSIFICATION OF INCOME AND THE TAXATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL CROSS-BORDER PARTNERSHIPS 
by 
Afton Leandre Appollis 
APPAFT001 
 
SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
 
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree MCom (Taxation) 
Faculty of Commerce 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
 
Date of submission: 13 August 2010 
Supervisor: Jennifer Roeleveld, Department of Accounting, 






I, Afton Leandre Appollis, hereby declare that the work on which this research paper is 
based is my original work (except where acknowledgements indicate otherwise) and that 
neither the whole work nor any part of it has been, is being, or is to be submitted for 
another degree in this or any other university.  
 
I authorise the University to reproduce for the purpose of research either the whole or any 




















 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................3 
2 TAXATION OF DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS .................................................................................7 
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................... 7 
2.2 Legal Requirements for Formation .................................................................................................................... 8 
2.3 Different Types of Partnerships ......................................................................................................................... 9 
2.4 Legal Nature of Partnerships............................................................................................................................ 10 
2.5 Taxation of Partnerships ................................................................................................................................... 13 
2.6 Case Law on Partnerships ................................................................................................................................ 16 
2.7 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................................... 19 
3 INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER PARTNERSHIPS .................................. 19 
3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 19 
3.2 The OECD Partnership Report ........................................................................................................................ 21 
3.3 International Solutions Proposed to Classification of Income Difficulties .................................................... 23 
3.4 International Case Law ..................................................................................................................................... 27 
3.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................................... 31 
4 SOUTH AFRICAN TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER PARTNERSHIPS ................................... 32 
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 32 
4.2 Consideration of CIR v Epstein ........................................................................................................................ 33 
4.3 Consideration of CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd ............................................................................. 36 
4.4 Consideration of Grundlingh v CIR ................................................................................................................ 39 
4.5 Proposed Reconciliation of Case Law .............................................................................................................. 44 
4.6 Section 6quat and Cross-Border Partnerships ................................................................................................ 48 
4.7 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................................... 50 
5 PRACTICAL EXAMPLE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH ........................................... 51 
5.1 Circumstances of the Practical Example ......................................................................................................... 51 
5.2 OECD Approach ............................................................................................................................................... 52 
5.3 South African Approach ................................................................................................................................... 53 













The use of partnerships as a business vehicle has many advantages. It is easy to establish, 
requires very little in the way of documentation and registration, and is relatively simple in 
the manner of its administration. These factors contribute to the longevity of the institution 
since the days of the Roman conquerors to the current age of digital graphics and 
bandwidth. Yet, for all of its simplicity in a domestic context it becomes greatly 
complicated in its participation in international markets. Notwithstanding such difficulties, 
one finds that in an increasingly inter-active and globalised world it is the flexibility of 
partnerships which makes it a favoured business vehicle for international traders.   
 
As a legal concept, partnerships can be categorized as a group of persons united in their 
aim to achieve a particular business goal – whether such goal is the generation of profits 
generally or the more specific goal of completing a project. he pivotal characteristic of a 
partnership is that usually all of the partners are jointly and severally liable for the debts of 
the partnership. The greatest complexity attached to cross-border partnerships is that they 
are taxed differently across countries, with some jurisdictions taxing partnerships as 
separate legal entities (known as "opaque entities") while others do not tax the partnership 
itself and instead tax the partners (known as "fiscally transparent entities"). For instance, 
Belgium taxes partnerships as a separate legal entity subject to corporate income tax while 
in France partnerships occupy a curious legal position in that they are deemed to be 
taxpayers separate from its partners, yet the partnership itself is not directly liable to tax 
(Schaffner, 2000:218). The United States of America meanwhile, has adopted a unique 
approach in that an entity in that country may elect to be taxed either as a partnership or a 
corporate taxpayer in certain circumstances (Schaffner, 2000:218).   
 
Further difficulties arise in that there are degrees of transparency which may apply to a 
particular fiscally transparent partnership. In his analysis of the issue, Baker (2002:22) 
mentions that there are four types of transparency which may be identified: complete 
transparency where the partnership has no legal existence at all or is completely ignored 
from a tax perspective; where the ultimate tax liability for the income rests with partners 
but where the income or gains of the partnership is reported as though it were a separate 
entity; where the partnership or the partners may elect for the partnership to be transparent 











liability for the other income rests with the partnership. Given these difficulties, Daniels 
(1991:1) comments that most tax professionals regard the taxation of cross-border 
partnerships as a 'trap for the unwary'.  
 
Added to this is the fact that cross-border trading carries with it the inherent risk of 
international double taxation (Olivier & Honiball, 2008:4). In the international arena, there 
are two forms of international double taxation: economic and juridical double taxation. 
Economic double taxation arises when the same income is taxed in two different taxpayers' 
hands (Olivier & Honiball, 2008:4). This would occur when profits would be taxed in the 
hands of the company; while once those same profits are distributed to the shareholders in 
the form of dividends, such dividends would be taxed in the hands of the shareholders. 
Juridical double taxation arises when the income is taxed in one taxpayer's hands in two 
different countries (Olivier & Honiball, 2008:4). This would occur when one country 
would tax its residents on their worldwide income while the other country would tax the 
same income on the basis that it was generated within its borders. In an attempt to avoid 
juridical double taxation, countries enter into double taxation agreements ("DTA's") which 
set out which country would be entitled to tax which type of income in which set of 
circumstances. DTA's are designed to set out the tax treatment of specific types of income. 
However, DTA's do not set down any general rules which would link such income to 
specific taxpayers (Ault, 2002:263). As a result, double taxation and double non-taxation 
remains a possibility where the two countries interpret the DTA in different ways (Ault, 
2002:263).  
 
In this work, the terms 'DTA', 'treaty' and 'tax treaty' are used interchangeably.     
 
International organisations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development ("OECD"), have published model tax conventions in an attempt to ensure a 
measure of standardization of the contents of DTA's between its members (Olivier & 
Honiball, 2008:7). The OECD currently has thirty members (Olivier & Honiball, 2008:9). 
South Africa is not a member state, but has what is known as 'observer' status (Olivier & 
Honiball, 2008:9). In order for amendments to be made to the model conventions, it is 
necessary for the unanimous consent of all the member countries to be obtained (Olivier & 
Honiball, 2008:9). Given the inherent difficulty of this, amendments and proposed 











the provisions of the model conventions. In the international arena, most tax treaties are 
based on the OECD model conventions (Olivier & Honiball, 2008:10). Moreover, most of 
South Africa's tax treaties are based on the OECD model conventions. 
 
OECD member states adopt varied approaches when it comes to the taxation of cross-
border partnerships (Schaffner, 2000:218). The areas of disagreement were summarized by 
Schaffner (2000:218) as follows: 
 
i) Whether the protection of the DTA should be provided to the partnership itself 
or the partners – Schaffner further notes that some OECD member states adopt 
the view that the treaty benefits should be afforded to the partnership given that 
the taxable base is determined at the level of the partnership and not the 
partners; 
 
ii) Whether the tax credit should be available to the partnership or the partners 
when double taxation relief is to be provided in terms of the DTA; and 
 
iii) The manner in which foreign entities should be classified for tax purposes – 
Jones (2002:288) notes that categorization is important for both states. 
Categorization is important for the source state in determining whether it is the 
entity or the members which are to be taxed; which rate of rate of tax would be 
applicable; how the taxable income should be calculated; and for purposes of 
applying the relevant DTA, whether it is the entity or the members who are the 
residents of the state (Jones, 2002:288). For the residence state, the importance 
of categorization lies in determining what type of income is to be taxed; when 
such income is to be taxed – either at distribution to the members or at the time 
that it is earned; and whether the tax credit should be made available at the level 
of the entity or the members (Jones, 2002:288).  
 
As a result of these important differences, the greater majority of tax treaties ignore 
partnerships altogether (Schaffner, 2000:218).  Schaffner comments that there are some 











approach can be discerned from these treaties (Schaffner, 2000:218). In his analysis of 
these treaties, Schaffner (2000:219) notes that some treaties would make even the 
transparent partnership the subject of treaty protection while others would specifically state 
that the treaty is not to apply to partnerships or the income derived from the partnership. 
Yet other treaties would specifically address the manner in which partnerships are to be 
taxed so as to avoid double taxation (Schaffner, 2000:219). 
 
The taxation of international partnerships has particular relevance for South Africa. 
Zaaiman (2008:5) remarks that South African investors often have limited choice in the 
legal form of the entity in which they invest. Their lack of choice largely stems from the 
fact that the type of legal structure implemented internationally is shaped by the tax and 
commercial concerns relevant to the foreign jurisdiction in which such structure is 
established (Zaaiman, 2008:5).  
 
In South Africa, the taxation of partnerships has received very little attention. There is also 
no legislation in place dealing with this business vehicle. However, many South Africans 
are investing in offshore partnerships. There is accordingly a need to develop a 
comprehensive work on the taxation of cross-border partnerships. Furthermore, on a 
domestic level, the recent judgment delivered in Grundlingh v CSARS
1
 raised several 
issues regarding the taxation of cross-border partnerships. Of particular relevance to the 
common law of South Africa, is the yet unresolved tension which now seems to exist 
between the Grundlingh case and the well-established principles of the taxation of 
international partnerships as laid down by the then Appellate Division in the CIR v 
Epstein
2
 judgment. The comments made regarding partnerships in the CIR v Lever Bros
3
 
judgment also seems to conflict with the Grundlingh case. Bearing in mind the principle of 
stare decisis and the constitutional obligation to develop South African common law in 
line with international law, it is necessary that a body of work be developed to begin the 
process of reconciling South African sources of law into one coherent approach, to the 
taxation of cross-border partnerships. 
 
                                               
1 Grundlingh v CSARS [2009] 72 SATC 1 (Grundlingh) 
2 CIR v Epstein [1954] 19 SATC 221 (Epstein) 











This study seeks to determine the South African approach to the taxation of international 
partnerships. The different sources of law dealing with this issue will be considered and 
analysed. In determining this stance, the approaches adopted internationally will be 
considered. The interaction between South African domestic law and DTA's will also be 
investigated. The OECD issued a Partnership Report
4
 in 1999 which sought to address the 
tax issues arising from the taxation of cross-border partnerships. Jones (2002:288) hailed 
this report as a "significant contribution" to the development of a coherent international 
approach to the taxation of partnerships across countries. The Partnership Report, which 
espouses certain proposed solutions to particular cross-border partnership situations, will 
be analysed to determine whether the South African approach is in keeping with 
international tax law. This work will seek to address the distinct lack in any substantive 
research work on the issue of cross-border partnership taxation in South Africa.  
 
The manner in which this work will address the issue of the taxation of cross-border 
partnerships is to provide an overview of the legal nature of a domestic partnership in 
South Africa, as found in chapter 1, which will be followed by an account of the relevant 
case law on the issues in chapter 2. Chapter 3 provides an account of the international 
views and approaches adopted in the tax treatment of cross-border partnerships. Chapter 4 
proposes a reconciliation of the relevant case law with a view to provide a coherent South 
African approach to the issue. A practical example is considered in Chapter 5. The 
conclusion in chapter 6 sets out the salient elements which characterizes the South African 
approach, and which are in keeping with that found in international law.  
 
2 TAXATION OF DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS 
2.1 Introduction 
Partnerships have been around for centuries. In his consideration of the ancient origin of 
partnerships, Henning (2006:178) notes that the most rudimentary form of a partnership 
can be traced back to our earliest understandings of family and clan arrangements. 
However, the Romans provided the most significant influences to the shaping of the 
modern principles of partnership law that we are familiar with today (Henning, 2006:178). 
 
                                               
4 The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships, as incorporated into the 











Partnerships have a very particular seating in South African law. They are not governed 
and regulated by legislation as with companies and close corporations which are governed 
by the Companies Act and Close Corporations Act respectively. Instead, the principles and 
rules governing the formation, management, and dissolution of partnerships are to be found 
in South African common law. Over the years, a number of principles have evolved 
regarding the legal treatment in general and the tax treatment specifically of partnerships. 
In instances where the principles emerging from our courts have taken a turn not agreeable 
to the South African Revenue Services ("SARS"), the Income Tax Act
5
 (ITA) would be 
changed to correct it. This is illustrated by the introduction of section 24H into the ITA 
which regulates partnerships specifically. This section, introduced to apply to years of 




This chapter will set out the South African position on the legal treatment of partnerships 
in general, together with a consideration of the taxation of partnerships on a domestic level. 
In doing so, the legal principles relating to the formation, management and dissolution of a 
partnership enterprise will be considered from a legal perspective. This will be followed by 
an outline of the legislative landscape relevant to the taxation of partnerships. Regard will 
also be given to the tax case law which has developed in the area. 
  
2.2 Legal Requirements for Formation 
Henning (2006:177) defines a partnership as "a legal relationship arising from a contract 
between two or more persons, usually not exceeding twenty, each contributing to a 
business or undertaking carried on in common, with the object of making and sharing 
profits". Watermeyr J in Hoheisen v CIR
7
 remarked that: 
 
"[p]artnership does not consist merely of a contract; it is a relationship between parties 
which arises from a contract, and if the contract is not carried out, then the relationship of 




                                               
5 Act 58 of 1962 
6 Sacks v CIR [1946] 13 SATC 343 
7 Hoheisen v CIR  [1931] 5 SATC 207 











The judgment of Joubert v Tarry and Co
9
 established the following elements which must 
be present in order for a partnership relationship to be formed: 1) each partner is to 
contribute either money, labour or skills to the partnership; 2) the partnership business 
must be carried on for the joint benefit of the partners; 3) the object of the partnership must 
be to make a profit; and 4) the partnership agreement or contract between the partners must 
be valid. 
 
The simplicity involved in the formation of a partnership is one of the advantages of its use 
as a business vehicle. There are no formal requirements for the conclusion of a partnership 
agreement, and the agreement may be oral, tacit or reduced to writing. It is important to 
note, however, that should the partnership agreement be reduced to writing, in terms of 
section 83(8)(a)(iv) of the Attorneys Act
10
 only an attorney, notary or conveyancer may 
draw up any agreement, deed or writing relating to the creation, variation of terms or 
dissolution of any partnership where such work is to be rewarded by a fee. It is advisable 
for the partnership agreement to be reduced to writing, as the existence of the agreement 
would greatly reduce the burden of having to prove the partnership's existence. On the 
other hand, it would behove prospective partners to remember that the drawing up of a 
partnership agreement alone without the implementation of its terms would not ensure that 
a partnership was in fact established - as the cases below will illustrate. Furthermore, no 
registration is required before a partnership may be formed. There is also no requirement 
that the partnership's annual financial statements are to be audited as is the case with 
companies. However, most creditors would insist on such an audit before advancing any 
credit to the partnership.  
 
The partnership is therefore easy to establish and manage as compared to other business 
vehicles in South Africa. 
 
2.3 Different Types of Partnerships 
There are two types of partnerships in South Africa: ordinary and extraordinary 
partnerships. Extraordinary partnerships comprise the partnership en commandite and the 
silent or anonymous partnership.  
                                               
9 Joubert v Tarry and Co [1915] TPD 277 












Partners of an ordinary partnership are jointly and severally liable for the debts of the 
partnership. On the other hand, the common factor of extraordinary partnerships is that not 
all of the partners are liable for the debts of the partnership vis-à-vis outsiders (Henning, 
2006:192). A further commonality is that both the partner en commandite and silent 
partner's identity is not disclosed to persons outside of the partnership (Henning, 
2006:193). Such undisclosed partners do not participate in the business of the partnership 
(Henning, 2006:193). The difference lies in the extent of the partner en commandite and 
the silent partner's liability for the losses of the partnership. The partner en commandite is 
only liable for the loss to the extent of his contribution made to the partnership en 
commandite. The silent partner on the other hand is liable to his co-partners for his pro rata 
share of the partnership's total debts.  
 
Should there be any uncertainty as to whether an extraordinary or ordinary partnership has 
been established, it was noted by the court in ITC 248
11
 that the presumption exists in 
favour of an ordinary partnership having been formed by the parties.  
 
2.4 Legal Nature of Partnerships 
A partnership is not a separate legal entity in South Africa. Given that the partnership is 
transparent, it would be reasonable to expect the assets of the partnership to vest in the 
partners in their individual capacities. Instead, as was confirmed in the Sacks v CIR 
judgment further discussed below, each partner holds an undivided share in the partnership 
assets in terms of South African law.  
 
Further consequences flow from the transparency of the partnership. One of them is that 
the partner cannot be a creditor or a debtor of the partnership (Henning, 2006:249). Also, 
one partner cannot claim the rendering of specific performance to the partnership by 
another partner (Henning, 2006:250). In so far as the division of profits is concerned, 
partners can agree to distribute the profits in accordance with any ratio. However, in the 
absence of such specific agreement profits are to be distributed between the partners 
according to the contributions made by each to the partnership (Henning, 2006:242). 
Should the value of each partner's contribution not be determinable, the profits are to be 
                                               











shared equally between them (Henning, 2006:242). It is the same with the losses of the 
partnership. The partners are entitled to determine a ratio in their partnership agreement in 
accordance with which the losses of the partnership are to be shared amongst the partners 
(Henning, 2006:242). In the absence of such agreement, it was noted in ITC 248 that the 
losses will be shared in the same ratio as the partners' profit sharing arrangement.  
 
One of the drawbacks of a partnership as a business vehicle is that it offers a distinct lack 
of continuity. A partnership will be dissolved upon the happening of any one of the 
following events (Henning, 2006: 268): 
 
i) Effluxion of time – A partnership agreement may stipulate that the partnership 
is to exist for a specific period only, in which event after the lapsing of such 
specific period the partnership will cease to exist. 
 
ii) Completion of business or undertaking – Similarly, a partnership agreement 
may state that the partnership is formed for the particular purpose of achieving a 
particular business goal. Once such goal is achieved, the partnership is 
dissolved. 
 
iii) Agreement of dissolution – As the partnership itself is an agreement between 
the partners; the partners are free to enter into a subsequent agreement whereby 
they agree to dissolve the partnership. This is the most common means of 
terminating a partnership. 
 
iv) Change in membership – As the partnership has no legal persona of its own, the 
existence of the partnership is keenly attuned to the identity of the individual 
partners. Thus, the death; retirement; admission or resignation of a partner 
would dissolve the partnership. The remaining partners would have to establish 
a new partnership should they wish to continue the business of the old 
partnership. All the assets and liabilities of the old partnership are to be 












v) Sequestration – Should any one of the partner's personal estate or the estate of 
the partnership be sequestrated, it would have the effect of dissolving the 
partnership. In the event that it is the partnership estate which is sequestrated, 
each partner's private estate would also be sequestrated. This can be avoided by 
one or some or all of the partners undertaking to pay the debts of the 
partnership and providing security for this purpose. An important exception to 
this general rule is that the estate of a partner en commandite or a silent partner 
would not be sequestrated together with that of the partnership.  
 
vi) Partner declared mentally ill – Should any one of the partners be declared 
mentally ill by a court of law, the court would in the ordinary course dissolve 
the partnership in the same court order or in a subsequent order. 
 
vii) Partner becomes an alien enemy – A partnership would be dissolved by the 
breaking out of war between two countries where some of the partners are 
domiciled in one country and others in the other country. The partnership would 
also be dissolved should a de facto state of war exist between the countries 
without a formal declaration of war having been made. However, in this event, 
a declaratory order from the court should be obtained to dissolve the 
partnership. 
 
viii) Frustration – Once it becomes objectively impossible for the partnership to 
realise its commercial purpose on account of factors outside of the partners' 
control, the partnership is dissolved. 
 
ix) Notice of Dissolution – A partnership formed without the specifying of a fixed 
term can be dissolved by any one of the partner's serving the others with a 
notice notifying them that he no longer wishes to be part of the partnership. 
This notice cannot be served upon the partners at an unreasonable or 
inconvenient time, and must be given in good faith. A notice would be 
delivered in bad faith when the partner intends to take up an opportunity for 
himself after the dissolution of the partnership which would otherwise have 











time that the notice is delivered must be determined with reference to a 
consideration of the interest of the partnership as a whole. 
 
x) Just or lawful cause – A partner may obtain a court order to dissolve the 
partnership provided that his actions in doing so are justifiable and reasonable 
under the circumstances of the particular case. The court may make this order 
even though the other partners are against the dissolution of the partnership. 
Gross and persistent negligence; the constant bickering and quarrelling of the 
partners – and not largely due to the applicant – which has the effect of the 
partnership business being suspended; and the prolonged absence of one of the 
partners are some of the causes which were held by a court to constitute just and 
reasonable causes for the dissolution of the partnership. 
 
2.5 Taxation of Partnerships 
It was confirmed in R v Levy & others
12
 that a partnership is not a separate legal entity in 
South Africa, and therefore is not subject to tax. Instead, the partners are subject to tax in 
their individual capacities on the profits generated in the partnership, as is confirmed by 
section 77(7) of the ITA. However, in determining the profits of the partnership, section 
66(15) of the ITA requires that a joint return be submitted in respect of the partnership. In 
theory, each partner is individually liable to present a joint return. The practice of SARS on 
the other hand is to accept a copy of the financial return of the partnership from one 
partner. SARS would then apportion the taxable income of the partnership amongst the 
partners according to their profit-sharing ratio.  
 
The date of the accrual of such partnership profits was a contentious issue for many years. 
The importance of the accrual concept stems from its use in the definition of 'gross income' 
as is found in section 1 of the ITA. This definition, in so far as it is relevant here, reads as 
follows: 
 
"'gross income', in relation to any year or period of assessment, means-  
 
(i)     in the case of any resident, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by or 
accrued to or in favour of such resident; or  
 
                                               











(ii)     in the case of any person other than a resident, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, 
received by or accrued to or in favour of such person from a source within or deemed to be 
within the Republic,  
 
during such year or period of assessment, excluding receipts or accruals of a capital nature" 
 
The date of the receipt or accrual of income determines in which year of assessment the 
taxpayer would be taxed on such income. As is indicated in the 'gross income' definition, 
SARS must include an amount in the taxpayer's income either when it is received by, or 
when it accrues to, the taxpayer. It was confirmed in the CIR v Delfos
13
 case that SARS 
may not tax the income in both the year in which such income accrues and is received by 
the taxpayer. The meaning of the term 'accrual' was settled by the Appellate Division case 
of CIR v Peoples Stores (Walvis Bay) Pty Ltd
14
. The court found that an accrual was an 
amount to which the taxpayer became entitled. This judgment confirmed Watermeyr J's 




In the case of partnerships, each partner's share of the partnership profits would accrue to 
him before he actually received it. This is because the date of accrual would occur once the 
profits of the partnership are determined in the financial statements of the partnership, as 
was confirmed in the Sacks v CIR judgment discussed further below, while such 
partnership profits would later be distributed between the partners according to their profit-
sharing ratio. The date of accrual is therefore of vital importance in respect of partnerships 
as it would determine the tax year in which each of the partners would be taxed on their 
share of the partnerships profits, notwithstanding the date it is received by them. There was 
thus much scope for partners to manipulate the tax year in which they were taxed on their 
partnership profits. Partners would delay the drawing up of the partnership's financial 
statements bringing about the result that for so long as the partnership profits were not 
determined, there were no profits which accrued to them. 
 
The introduction of section 24H of the ITA settled the date of accrual of partnership profits 
for years of assessment ending on or after 1 January 1989. The section is generally aimed 
at the settling of the date of accrual in respect of partners and in regulating the tax 
treatment of limited partners specifically. Section 24H(1) includes in the definition of a 
'limited partner' a partner of an extraordinary partnership. Section 24H(2) deems each 
                                               
13 CIR v Delfos 1933 AD 242 
14 CIR v Peoples Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd 1990 (2) SA 353 (A) 











partner of the partnership to be carrying on the trade or business of the partnership. Thus, 
despite the fact that a limited partner would not participate in the business of the 
partnership, he would nonetheless be deemed to be carrying on the business of such 
partnership for tax purposes. De Swart (2008:389) notes that section 24H(3) serves as an 
anti-avoidance provision to discourage the use of limited partnerships in anti-avoidance 
schemes. The subsection limits the deduction a limited partner may claim in respect of the 
partnership business to the sum of the amount for which he is or may be held liable to any 
creditor of the partnership, and any income received by or accrued to him from that 
partnership business. The remainder of the deduction or allowance so disallowed is to be 
carried forward to the next year of assessment in terms of section 24H(4).  
 
Section 24H(5) deals with the date of accrual of the profits of the partnership to the 
partners. The subsection stipulates that any income which has been received by or accrued 
to the partners in common is deemed to accrue to the partners in their profit-sharing ratio 
on the same date on which it is received by or accrues to the partnership. Expenses and 
allowances relating to such amounts are also deemed to be those of the individual partners 
in terms of section 24H(5)(b). This subsection was introduced in response to the judgment 
in Sacks v CIR. In that case, the court held that the date which the profits of the partnership 
accrued to the partners was when such profits became ascertainable at the conclusion of the 
agreed period for the accounting of the profits. It was noted by Watermeyr CJ in delivering 
the judgment that: 
 
"[i]t is clear that during the subsistence of a partnership agreement the partnership property 
is owned in common in undivided shares. Consequently, save in so far as the partnership 
agreement may modify the position, the receipts and accruals in the partnership business are 
acquired by the partners in common and no one partner acquires any several right of 
ownership in the receipts or accruals of the partnership. Furthermore, a partnership 
agreement almost invariably provides, either expressly or by implication, for the division of 
profits after the lapse of fixed periods of time. The effect of such a clause in a partnership 
agreement is to place an obligation upon the partners to continue to hold the receipts and 
accruals of the partnership business in common, subject to an obligation to bring them into 
account at the end of each fixed period for the purpose of ascertaining the profit or loss for 
the accounting period. When that time arrives, then, for the first time under the partnership 
agreement, a partner becomes entitled to claim a separate determinable share of the 
partnership profits and then, for the first time under the partnership agreement, that 
determinable share accrues to him as gross income. Besides a partner’s right to claim such 
separate share of the partnership profits under the conditions of the partnership agreement, 
he also acquires such a right when the partnership agreement terminates, eg, by dissolution, 




                                               











The effect of section 24H(5) then is that the income, deductions or allowances of the 
partnership accrue to the partners on a daily basis with no regard to the accounting period 
of the partnership.  
 
In Chipkin (Natal) (Pty) Ltd v CSARS
17
 a further principle was developed. In the judgment, 
it was held that once a partner sold his share in the partnership he in fact recouped a 
portion of the allowances previously granted in respect of the partnership assets. The 
recoupment would arise notwithstanding the fact that the partnership assets were still in 
use by the partnership.  
 
2.6 Case Law on Partnerships 
The prevailing case law on partnerships from a domestic perspective is largely centered on 
family partnerships. The issue in these cases is whether the parties were successful in 
having established the partnership. The onus in such cases is on the taxpayer, in terms of 
section 82 of the ITA, to prove that a partnership actually exists. From a taxation 
perspective, the importance of successfully establishing the existence of the partnership 
lies in the fact that the partnership profits would be shared amongst the partners and would 
be taxed in their hands as opposed to all of the profits being taxed in one person's hands.  
 
The leading case in this area is Hoheisen v CIR
18
. In this matter, the taxpayer was a 
building contractor who had been assisted by his son for seven years. At one point the 
taxpayer had to visit Europe for a period. Before his departure, he informed his son that he 
would take the son up as his partner if the son managed to run the business to his 
satisfaction in his absence. When the taxpayer returned from his visit, and having found 
that his son had managed the business well, he offered the partnership to his son. While his 
son had accepted the offer, nothing further was done. The existence of the partnership was 
not conveyed to the taxpayer's bankers, employees or business associates. Nor did the son 
contribute any capital toward the partnership. No partnership agreement had been drawn 
up between the taxpayer and his son, and the financial records of the business did not 
reflect the son as a partner. The Commissioner taxed the total profits of the business in the 
hands of the taxpayer. The taxpayer objected to this, arguing that as a partnership had been 
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formed between himself and his son half of the profits fell to be taxed in his son's hands. 
The court upheld the lower's court's finding that the taxpayer had promised to take the son 
into partnership with him, which the son had accepted. However, this promise was never 
implemented so as to in fact establish a relationship of partnership between the parties. The 
court therefore confirmed the correctness of the assessment raised by the Commissioner. 
 
The importance of drawing up a partnership agreement was emphasized in ITC 315
19
. The 
taxpayer earned rentals from the leasing of certain properties owned by him and interest 
income. He argued that the assets generating the income were held by him in partnership 
with his wife and stepdaughter. The court was not convinced, especially as the exact date 
when the partnership was alleged to have come into existence was not known. The court 
noted that no disclosure of the partnership was made by the taxpayer to anyone. While the 
court took into account the relative simplicity and lack of sophistication of the parties 
involved, the court stated that it did nonetheless expect some definiteness and precision 
from them with regard to their business arrangements. The absence of a partnership 
agreement was lamented by the court before it held that the taxpayer had failed to prove 
the existence of the partnership. 
 
It is important to note that even if a partnership agreement is in place, it does not mean that 
such action alone will establish a partnership. The agreement must be implemented in 
order for the partnership relationship to be formed. This was the court's finding in ITC 
248
20
. In this matter, a taxpayer had established a lucrative business and claimed that he 
had formed a partnership with his three sons. He therefore argued that he was only entitled 
to one-fourth of the profits, and should be taxed accordingly. While a partnership 
agreement was drawn up in casu, its terms made it clear that there was no actual intention 
for the sons to share in the profits of the business. Also, while the sons were credited with 
their share of the profits in the books of the business, none of them actually withdrew 
anything from the partnership. The court further noted that no disclosure of the partners, as 
was then required in terms of the Registration of Business Act (since repealed), had been 
made; the change from a sole proprietor to a partnership was not advertised; and the 
business' bankers were not informed of the change. In fact, everything continued as if 
nothing had changed. In making its finding that the taxpayer had failed to prove the 
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existence of the partnership, the court found the following dictum of Rowlatt J in 
Dickenson v Gross
21
 in point: 
 
"They think by putting a piece of paper in the drawer they can make an income tax 
partnership, and they can go on treating the undertaking as though it were still the sole 




Finally, in ITC 1083
23
, the court accepted that a certain degree of laxity may be involved in 
the management of family partnerships. The taxpayer carried on a hotel and grocery 
business in association with his two brothers. Each brother was allocated a task in the 
running of the business. The bank account of the business was in the name of the one 
brother, the lease of the premises and the municipal license to trade was in the name of the 
wife of one of the brothers, and the eldest brother entered into contracts on behalf of the 
business in his own name. The court held that rational explanations existed for this state of 
affairs, not least of all being the minority status of the youngest brother. The court held that 
while the brothers were not familiar with normal business standards and that they had a 
fairly elementary understanding of a partnership, they had succeeded in proving the 
existence of an equal partnership between them.  
 
As these cases illustrate, the greatest hurdle facing family partnerships is not so much the 
greater scrutiny SARS would afford such a business vehicle but rather the laxity inherent 
in such family affairs. As a general guideline, De Swart (2008:389) proposes that the 
following steps be taken in order to ensure that the onus resting on the taxpayer to prove 
the existence of a family partnership be met: 
 
i) A partnership agreement must be drawn up; 
 
ii) A bank account for the partnership should be opened and used by the partners; 
 
iii) The existence of the partnership should be disclosed to customers, creditors and 
other business associates of the business; 
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iv) Each partner should contribute something to the partnership; and 
 
v) The partnership agreement should be given effect to in the books of the 




It is evident that while the formation and management of a partnership is relatively simple 
and straight-forward, there are certain steps which must nonetheless be taken to ensure that 
a partnership has actually been established – particularly in the eyes of SARS. From a 
domestic taxation perspective, the importance lies in the fact that the failure to properly 
establish a partnership would result in all of the profits arising from the business venture 
being taxed in one person's hands – and not spread between all of the partners. With family 
partnerships there is an inherent risk that the vital ste s to establish a partnership will not 
always be followed. From an international taxation perspective, the importance of this lies 
in the fact that the failure to properly establish a partnership would result in the profits 
being taxed in one person's hands as his/her personal income rather than as business profits 
which may have very different international tax consequences. This aspect will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 below. 
 
3 INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER PARTNERSHIPS 
3.1 Introduction 
The taxation of cross-border partnerships has been the subject of much debate over the last 
few years. This particular issue has particular relevance for the international community 
given the preponderance of partnerships in one form or another across various 
jurisdictions. In response to the growing need to develop a coherent international approach 
to the tax treatment of cross-border partnerships and all the issues related thereto, the 
OECD published its report on the application of the OECD model tax convention
24
to 
partnerships in 1999. However, as the commentators on the Partnership Report have noted 
below, this work seemed to create as many problems as it sought to resolve. 
                                               












In examining the Partnership Report and the works of commentators thereon, this work 
will focus on the issues related to conflicts between states on their classification of the 
relevant income. Such conflicts arise when two or more states interpret a provision in the 
DTA differently and accordingly apply the DTA differently (Rust, 2003:45). If the nature 
of the income is classified differently it could well fall under different articles of the 
applicable DTA between two countries (states). 
 
Besides the classification of income, DTA’s seek to address a fundamental conflict relating 
to which State has the right to tax the income. In cross-border transactions, there are two 
states – namely, the source and the residence state – that would be entitled to tax the 
income arising from such transaction. The source state entitlement to tax is based on the 
fact that the income arose as a result of the activities conducted within its borders. Olivier 
& Honiball (2008:59) note that rules to establish the source of income is usually absent 
from treaties. As a result, it would seem that source must be determined with reference to 
the domestic laws of the relevant state involved. From a South African perspective, the 
Lever Bros judgment determined that the source of income is the originating cause of the 
income or what gave rise to the income. The source concept is further discussed in Chapter 
4 below. On the other hand, the residence state is entitled to tax on the basis that its 
domestic laws entitles it to tax its residents on their worldwide income. DTA's are designed 
to resolve this conflict which exists between the source state and residence state's 
overlapping entitlement to tax the same income in the same person's hands and therefore 
avoid juridical double taxation. 
 
Articles 6 to 21 of the OECD model convention, on which most DTA’s are based, either 
grants or limits the source state's right to tax the income generated in its territory. Article 
23 of the OECD model convention concerns the residence state. This article specifies the 
manner in which the residence state is to relieve the taxpayer of the burden of double 
taxation in instances where the source state is entitled to tax the income pursuant to articles 
6 to 21. Rust (2003:46) notes that in most cases articles 6 to 21 would not concern the 
residence state. In fact, the residence state often does not even have to classify the income 
at all. All that is required of the residence state is that it grants relief from double taxation 
under article 23 in instances where the source state taxes the income in accordance with the 












This particular aspect of international tax is an area of continual debate and of importance 
for partnerships as they continue to be regarded as viable vehicles for international 
investment and business undertakings.  
 
3.2 The OECD Partnership Report 
The Partnership Report largely discusses the application of the OECD model tax 
conventions to partnerships. In order for a partnership to have access to the relief afforded 
in a DTA, it must be regarded as a person who is a resident of one or both of the 
Contracting States to the DTA in terms of article 1 of the DTA.  
 
Article 3(1) of the OECD model convention defines a person as including an individual, a 
company and any other body of persons. The Partnership Report confirms that a 
partnership is a 'person' for purposes of a DTA. Article 4(1) of the OECD model 
convention further defines a resident as "any person who, under the law of that state, is 
liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of management or any other 
criterion of a similar nature". Baker (2002:2) notes that the OECD has adopted the view 
that "liable to tax" does not mean that the person must actually be paying tax in the state. 
Rather, an entity would be "liable to tax" so long as the state could assert jurisdiction to tax 
that entity on its worldwide income in terms of one of the internationally accepted bases 
for full tax liability (Baker, 2002:3). In its application to partnerships, the Commentary on 
the OECD model tax convention further takes the view that a fiscally transparent 
partnership would not be liable to tax in the state in which it is so regarded. As a result, the 
partnership cannot be a resident as contemplated in article 4(1). The partnership would 
accordingly have no access to the relief provided to residents in the DTA. 
 
The Partnership Report recognises that the real complexities involve situations where one 
state would regard a partnership as fiscally transparent while another would regard it as 
opaque. In its endeavour to develop a coherent approach to the taxation of cross-border 
partnerships in light of the complexities involved in the differing treatment of partnerships 
internationally, the Partnership Report considers various possible scenarios concerning the 











to resolve the problems arising in those situations. Baker (2002:5) summarises these 
principles as follows: 
 
i) Partnerships are "persons" as defined in article 3(1) either because they are a 




ii) A fiscally transparent partnership cannot be a resident as contemplated in article 
4(1); 
 
iii) Fiscal transparency would be determined with reference to whether the personal 
characteristics of the partners determine the amount of tax which would be 
payable on the partnership income; 
 
iv) The partners of fiscally transparent partnerships would be entitled to the 
benefits of the treaty, as entered into by such partners' state of residence, in 
respect of the partnership income allocated to such partner. The nature and 
source of the partnership income shall be retained, and the income shall also be 
regarded as having been paid to or derived by the partners; and 
 
v) The source state should take into account whether the state of residence has 
treated the partnership as fiscally transparent or opaque.  
 
Baker (2002:4) comments that the solutions proposed by the OECD in its Partnership 
Report are largely pragmatic and reason-driven as opposed to legally motivated. Also, 
Lang (2000:37) notes that the OECD has largely failed to provide reasons for its proposed 
solutions. This failing on the part of the OECD has greatly reduced its efficacy in that its 
persuasive authority is severely limited. However, Lang (2000:37) does comment that this 
particular area does raise difficult questions and some progress may be discerned from the 
fact that the OECD has chosen not to completely ignore these issues. 
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3.3 International Solutions Proposed to Classification of Income Difficulties 
The differing tax treatment of partnerships across jurisdictions raises the real possibility 
that the income generated from such partnerships would not be classified in the same way 
across those jurisdictions. The Partnership Report proposes that in cases where different 
articles of the DTA are applied to the partnership income by the two states as a result of 
their differing treatment of partnerships, the residence state is merely required to determine 
whether the source state has taxed the income in accordance with the provisions of the 
DTA when such residence state applies article 23 (Rust, 2003:45). The residence state is 
therefore not required to categorise the income itself (Rust, 2003:45). Article 23 of the 
OECD model convention would require the residence state to provide relief from the 
instance of double taxation notwithstanding the conflict of the classification of the income 
between the two states. 
 
This view is reflected in the Commentary on article 23A and B, as reflected in the 2000 
version of the OECD Commentary: 
 
"[w]here, due to differences in the domestic law between the State of source and the State of 
residence, the former applies, with respect to a particular item of income, provisions of the 
convention that are different from those that the State of residence would have applied to the 
same item of income, the income is still being taxed in accordance with the provisions of the 
convention, in this case as interpreted by the State of source. In such a case, therefore, article 
23 requires that relief from double taxation be granted by the State of residence 





Lang (2000:98) takes a different view. According to Lang (2000:98), in instances where 
the one country taxes the partnership at the level of the partnership and the other taxes the 
partnership at the level of the partners, it amounts to an instance of economic double 
taxation. There is no obligation on contracting states to provide relief from instances of 
economic double taxation, only from juridical double taxation. There is therefore no basis 
on which one may argue that the residence state should provide relief in terms of article 23, 
as is argued in the Partnership Report. 
 
Daniels (1991:185) argues, on the other hand, that article 23 does not impose a requirement 
of subject identity in that the provision does not specify that it must be the partner himself 
                                               











who must be subject to tax in both countries. The narrow view adopted by Lang cannot 
therefore be supported by the text of article 23.  
 
On evaluating the arguments raised above, Barenfeld (2005:197) comments that although 
Daniels' argument is compelling and attractive, the OECD Commentary on article 23 
specifically states that the article is meant to provide relief from juridical and not economic 
double taxation. However, the amendment to the Commentary in the wake of the 
Partnership Report now suggests that economic double taxation may well be covered by 
article 23 in the case of partnerships. The amended Commentary states that in instances 
where the partner's residence state classifies the partnership as fiscally transparent, both the 
income and the taxes paid by the partnership in the other country should flow through to 
the partners.  Barenfeld (2005:197) notes that the partner's residence state is therefore 
obliged to provide a credit even though it is the partnership and not the partner that has 
been subject to foreign tax. Barenfeld (2005:198) expresses the view that it is unlikely that 
the pragmatic approach taken in the Commentary will convince the partner's residence 
state to change its position. This is especially as the flow-through principle suggested by 
the OECD would essentially require the partner's state of residence to abandon its 
classification of the foreign entity for purposes of applying the DTA (Barenfeld, 
2005:198). The OECD model tax convention does not require such abandonment from any 
contracting state (Barenfeld, 2005:198). Barenfeld (2005:198) also laments the OECD's 
decision not to make the appropriate changes to the text of the model convention itself, 
particularly as the Commentary on the model convention now seems to be contradictory.  
 
Barenfeld (2005:252) proposes four of his own solutions to the classification of income 
issues involved in the taxation of cross-border partnerships. These are as follows: 
 
i) The Elimination of Residence Taxation – Barenfeld (2005:252 and 253) 
deemed this proposal to lack feasibility as the use and acceptance of source 
and residence basis of taxation is firmly established in the international 
community. It would be unrealistic to expect that all countries would abandon 












ii) The Harmonisation of Partnerships and Other Entities – Barenfeld (2005:253) 
also deems this proposal to lack feasibility. Barenfeld (2005:253) notes that 
this proposal would be faced with the great difficulty of overcoming 
differences in legal tradition and structures as well as balancing competing 
political interests. This proposal would further require an overarching 
international body to monitor the implementation of the proposal and also to 
supervise the stability of any harmonisation which would be achieved 
(Barenfeld, 2005:253). It is unlikely that this could be put in place. 
 
iii) Development of Classification Rules that would Ensure Symmetry – 
Barenfeld (2005:254) considers this proposal to be feasible. This approach 
proposes that classification rules should be established to ensure that a global 
balance is achieved in the taxation of cross-border partnerships, and that 
instances of double taxation are avoided. These rules can either be established 
on a per country basis through the use of DTA's or through the 
implementation of domestic legislation. Barenfeld (2005:254) further argues 
that this proposal could work when one considers that it is a very specific set 
of rules which would require change.   
 
iv) Development of Rules Ensuring Double Tax Relief Regardless of Any 
Asymmetry – Barenfeld (2005:255) also considers this proposal to be feasible.  
It is in fact the approach adopted by the OECD in its Partnership Report. 
Barenfeld (2005:255) argues that one can either change the design of a 
country's DTA or the design of its unilateral rules for double tax relief. 
Changing the DTA would allow the legislation to be tailored to fit the specific 
needs of a country's business vehicles, but would involve the time-consuming 
task of renegotiating DTA's (Barenfeld, 2005:255). On the other hand, 
changing the unilateral rules would apply to all cross-border business vehicles 
in its attempt to achieve the specified goal of avoiding double taxation, and 
would not require the specific consent of another country (Barenfeld, 
2005:255). However, such rules would not allow the specific characteristics of 
a particular business vehicle to be specifically catered for and addressed 












Jones (2002:269) suggests that the qualification of income conflicts could be avoided by 
the OECD clarifying in its model convention that article 23 does not require the residence 
state to itself classify the income in order to determine whether the source state should 
have taxed the income and, thus, whether it should give relief. Jones further suggests three 
more solutions to the classification of income conflicts. Jones (2002: 320) proposes that 
either the residence state of the partner is to follow the source state's categorisation of the 
partnership as either transparent or opaque, or the state that regards the partnership as 
opaque is to follow the other state's classification of the partnership as transparent. Both 
instances require one state to defer to the classification made by the other state (Jones, 
2002:320). Alternatively, Jones (2002:320) proposes that the treaty itself should categorise 
the partnership as either opaque or transparent. Jones (2002:320) notes, however, that the 
OECD model convention as it now stands is not equipped to make such classification. This 
is as the OECD model convention fails to make the distinction between companies and 
partnerships based on how such entities are taxed (Jones, 2002:315). The definition of a 
company is found in article 3(1)(b) of the OECD model tax convention as follows: 
 
"the term 'company' means any body corporate or any entity that is treated as a body 
corporate for tax purposes." 
 
In terms of this definition, Jones (2002:315) notes that a body corporate – which he has 
equated to a legal person – would be a company notwithstanding whether it is in fact taxed 
as such. Because of this definition, it is possible for some transparent partnerships to be 
treated as companies on account of their being body corporates (Jones, 2002:315). Jones 
(2002:316) thus proposes that the OECD model convention be amended to remove the 
assumption that all companies are opaque and all partnerships are transparent. Jones 
(2002:315) notes that while the assumption in respect of partnerships may be true generally 
in that 32 of the 37 types of general partnerships are transparent in the OECD countries 
mentioned in the Partnership Report, this assumption is now the subject of several 
exceptions. Such amendment would greatly assist in future treaty developments as states 
attempt to deal with conflicts in the classification of partnership income (Jones, 2002:320). 
Ultimately, Jones (2002:320) advocates that the conflicts in the classification of income 
should be addressed through the development of treaty solutions, and not solutions 












Rust (2003:45) adopts the view that the approach proposed in the Partnership Report and 
the 2000 version of the OECD Commentary leads to sound results in that the approach 
does avoid both double taxation and double non-taxation in instances of a conflict in the 
qualification of income between states. However, Rust (2003:45) further notes that this 
approach has its limits, and that uncertainty still exists as to whether the new approach 
would also be applicable to DTA's concluded before the 2000 amendments to the OECD 
Commentary. 
 
According to Rust (2003:50) the approach has its limits in that it depends on the residence 
state applying article 23. In instances where both states are entitled to tax the income in 
terms of the DTA, the residence state must apply article 23 to grant relief from double 
taxation even though in its interpretation of the DTA it has the exclusive right to tax the 
income (Rust, 2003:50). The approach proposed in the Partnership Report may be applied 
successfully in such instances to provide relief. However, Rust (2003:50) notes that the 
efficacy of the proposed approach is doubtful in instances where the residence state's 
application of the DTA would have it precluded from taxing the income at all. In such 
instances, cases of double non-taxation would arise where the source state is also of the 
view that it is precluded from taxing the income. Such instances cannot be remedied 
through the application of article 23. Rust (2003:50) therefore concludes that the approach 
proposed by the Partnership Report does not work in instances where, according to the 
residence state, the exclusive right to tax the income vests in the source state. In light of the 
distinct lack of a better approach, Rust (2003:50) argues that the approach proposed in the 
Partnership Report should nonetheless be followed until a better solution is developed. 
This will ensure that at the very least double taxation and double non-taxation can be 
avoided in the greater majority of cases (Rust, 2003:50).      
 
3.4 International Case Law 
An interesting case arose in France, SA Diebold Courtage, where the Conseil d'Etat sought 
to apply the suggestions proposed in the Partnership Report. France as the state of source 
had considered the tax treatment of the partnership in the partnership's state of residence, 
and had applied the OECD's flow-through principle to conclude that it was the partners 












In SA Diebold Courtage, a French company made rental payments to a Dutch limited 
partnership in respect of a sale and leaseback arrangement of certain computer equipment. 
Both the limited and the general partner were companies resident in the Netherlands. 
Approximately 65% of the rentals were then on-paid to a Swiss company. The French 
company partner argued that the rental payments were exempt from French tax in terms of 
article 12 of the France/Canada DTA of 16
th
 March 1973 which deals with royalties. This 
article reads as follows: 
 
"1. Royalties arising in one of the States and paid to a resident of the other State shall be 
taxable only in that other State. 
  
2. The term "royalties" as used in this Article means payments of any kind received as a 
consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific 
work (including cinematograph films and films or tapes for television or radio broadcasting), 
any patent, trade mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for the use of, or 
the right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, or for information 
concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience. 
  
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply if the recipient of the royalties, being a 
resident of one of the States, has in the other State in which the royalties arise a permanent 
establishment, or a fixed base for the carrying out of professional services, with which the 
right giving rise to the royalties is effectively connected. In that case the provisions of Article 
7 or Article 14, as the case may be, shall apply. 
  
4. Where, owing to a special relationship between the payer and the recipient or between 
both of them and some other person, the amount of the royalties paid, having regard to the 
use, right or information for which they are paid, exceeds the amount which would have 
been agreed upon by the payer and the recipient in the absence of such relationship, the 
provisions of this Article shall apply only to the last-mentioned amount. In that case, the 
excess part of the payments shall remain taxable according to the States' own laws, due 
regard being had to the other provisions of this Convention." 
 
France was entitled to tax the income earned by the Dutch partnership as the source of such 
receipts was the use of the computer equipment in France. On the other hand, the 
Netherlands was entitled to tax its residents on their worldwide income.  
  
The Conseil d'Etat, as the state of source, examined the fiscal treatment of the partnership 
in the state of residence, and noted that the partnership was fiscally transparent in the 
Netherlands. Accordingly, the Conseil d'Etat held that it was not the partnership which was 
the resident entitled to the treaty benefits, but rather the partner companies who were so 
entitled. Based on the evidence set forth before the Conseil d'Etat, there was nothing to 
persuade it that the partner companies were not in fact the beneficial owners of the rental 
income. The Conseil d'Etat then concluded that the rental income was taxable only in the 












It is interesting to compare this case with an earlier decision of the Conseil d'Etat where it 
was not a foreign partnership but a French partnership involved. In Re Société Kingroup
27
, 
a Canadian company had a 33% interest in a French groupement d'intérêt economique 
("GIE") which carried on business in France and was established under French law. In 
terms of French law, a GIE is not a partnership but its tax treatment is substantially similar 
to that of most partnerships in France. The GIE is required to submit tax returns, but the 
profits generated in the GIE are taxed in the hands of the associates of the GIE in 
proportion to their interest. Canada was entitled to tax the Canadian associate's share of the 
GIE profits as the residence state, while France was entitled to tax the GIE profits as the 
state of source. Understandably, the Canadian associate argued that profits were to be 
taxed in Canada either as business profits under article 7, royalties under article 12, or 
dividends under article 10 of the France/Canada DTA.  
 
The Conseil d'Etat adopted an interesting interpretation of 'business profits' in making its 
decision. It held that the term business profits under article 7 only applied to such profits 
which had been generated directly by the Canadian company, and not to the share of the 
profits of the GIE to which the Canadian company was entitled. Furthermore, the GIE 
profits distributed to the Canadian associate was neither a dividend nor a royalty. 
Accordingly, the DTA offered no exemption to the Canadian associate and the GIE profits 
distributed to it was subject to tax in France. 
  
A further interesting case dealing with the taxation of cross-border partnerships is that of 
the Belgium case of Rouquier et Rivay
28
. A French form of a partnership known as a 
Société Civile Immobilière ("SCI") was established with Belgian resident partners. A SCI 
is a special purpose vehicle used in France to build or acquire immoveable property for the 
purposes of letting such property. SCI's are used to manage such rental activities. A SCI 
can either have the title to the immoveable property automatically allocated to its partners 
(SCI d'attribution) or the title could remain in the SCI. In terms of French law, the SCI is 
an entity with separate legal personality but is treated as transparent for tax purposes 
(Neves, 2008:173). While the profits of the SCI are computed at the SCI level, the income 
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generated by the SCI are allocated to and taxed in the hands of its partners as income from 
real estate (Neves, 2008:173).  
 
France had taxed the income of the SCI in the hands of the individual partners as real 
estate income in the year in which such income was earned by the SCI. Once such profits 
were distributed to the individual partners, Belgium sought to tax the distribution as 
dividends received by the Belgian resident partners. In terms of the Court of Appeal 
decision, the court held that from a Belgian perspective the SCI was to be treated as a 
separate legal entity for tax purposes. This was regardless of the manner in which the entity 
was treated in France. Thus, the distribution received by the Belgian residents was a 
dividend and was to be taxed accordingly. The Court of Appeal further came to the 
decision that there was nothing in the France/Belgium DTA (dated 10 March 1964) which 
applied to classify such income as real estate income. Heavy reliance was placed on the 
Protocol to the DTA which was in force at the time. Article 2 of the Protocol (which 
corresponds to article 10 of the OECD model convention) confirmed that profits generated 
by a SCI d'attribution were taxable in France, while Belgium reserved its right to tax the 
profit distributed from such SCI's as dividends (Neves, 2008:175). Quaghebeur (2005:866) 
notes that the Protocol only applies to a specific kind of SCI and the entity in question was 
not of that kind. Quaghebeur (2005:866) further notes that the decision of the Court of 
Appeal was heavily criticized before the matter was finally resolved by the Supreme Court. 
 
This decision was overturned by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that article 2 
of the Protocol was inapplicable in this instance. The Supreme Court noted that 
"dividends" was defined in article 15(5) of the DTA and this article specifically referred to 
the definition of a dividend under French law. Under French law, a dividend is confined to 
profits distributed by a company which are subject to French corporate income tax. The 
SCI was not subject to French corporate income tax. The Supreme Court further held that a 
Belgian court cannot classify income as a dividend when it was classified as real estate 
income under French law. 
 
The Supreme Court held that the income was correctly taxed by France as real estate 
income in terms of article 3(2) of the DTA (which corresponds with article 6(2) of the 
OECD model convention). Article 3(2) stated that "the term immoveable property shall be 











question is situated". As a result, Belgium was not entitled to tax the income in terms of 
article 3(1) and (2) read with articles 19(A)(2) of the DTA. Article 19(A)(2) of the DTA 
provides that "income shall be exempt from the Belgian taxes if France has the exclusive 
right to levy taxes thereon". 
 
Quaghebeur (2005:866) welcomes the decision of the Supreme Court as he notes that relief 
has now been provided to Belgian resident companies. Had the income been classified as a 
dividend, the full amount of such dividend would have been subject to Belgian corporate 
income tax and the Belgian residents would not have had access to a participation 
exemption which otherwise exists under Belgian domestic law for dividends (Quaghebeur, 
2005:866). The participation exemption is only available in respect of distributions made 
by a company subject to Belgian corporate income tax (Quaghebeur, 2005:866). 
 
Neves (2008:171) notes in his analysis of the judgment that the approach adopted by the 
Supreme Court in arriving at its decision is not provided in the judgment. As a result, 
certain questions have remained open (Neves, 2008:171). It is unclear from the judgment 
whether the court actually regarded the income generation and distribution phases as 
irrelevant in arriving at its decision (Neves, 2008:171). On the other hand, it is equally 
unclear whether the court considered, on the correct reading of the DTA, whether the 
income was to be classified as real estate income rather than as dividend income (Neves, 
2008:171). Such uncertainty is unfortunate as this case seemed to embody exactly the 
classification of income issues sought to be addressed in the Partnership Report. Had the 
court provided its reasoning for the approach it decided to follow, it would have added 
great persuasive value to the debate. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The issue of the taxation of cross-border partnerships raises several difficult questions. The 
OECD attempted to address some of these difficulties with its Partnership Report. 
However, although this report is certainly a step in the right direction, the OECD's distinct 
failure to make use of legal motivations in favour of its use of pragmatic and outcome-
based reasoning has served to severely reduce the persuasive authority the report otherwise 
would have had on an international level. The OECD as well as many commentators 











partnerships across jurisdictions. It would seem, however, that the solution proposed in the 
Partnership Report – namely, the particular interpretation of article 23 – will remain as the 
only solution largely accepted by the international community at this point, 
notwithstanding the limitations of this solution as pointed out by commentators. 
 
4 SOUTH AFRICAN TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER PARTNERSHIPS 
4.1 Introduction 
It was remarked by Zaaiman (2008:5) that while there is certainly an increase in the 
number of South Africans investing in offshore entities, such investors typically have 
limited choice in the legal form of the entity in which they invest. Their lack of choice 
largely stems from the fact that the type of legal structure implemented internationally is 
shaped by the tax and commercial concerns relevant to the foreign jurisdiction in which 
such structure is established (Zaaiman, 2008:5). Many South Africans may find themselves 
investing in what is essentially a partnership. This adds impetus to the need to develop a 
coherent South African approach to the taxation of international partnerships.  
 
The taxation of cross-border partnerships bears particular relation to the competing 
interests of the state of residence and the state of source to tax the income generated either 
by its residents or within its borders. Since 2001, South Africa has adopted the residence 
basis of taxation in that all its residents would be taxed on their worldwide income. 
However, source is still relevant to the South African tax regime as non-residents of South 
Africa are taxed on their South African source income only. Source is also relevant in the 
international tax arena. As was mentioned at paragraph 3.1 above, the source state's right to 
tax profits generated within its borders is dealt with in the OECD model tax convention at 





"the source of receipts, received as income, is not the quarter whence they come, but the 
originating cause of their being received as income and that this originating cause is the 
work which the taxpayer does to earn them, the quid pro quo which he gives in return for 
which he receives them. The work which he does may be a business which he carries on, or 
an enterprise which he undertakes, or an activity in which he engages and it may take the 
form of personal exertion, mental or physical, or it may take the form of employment of 
capital either by using it to earn income or by letting its use to someone else."
30
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South African residents have the choice to seek relief from double taxation either through 
the application of a DTA or section 6quat of the ITA. Although the two options are similar 
in that both provide relief from double taxation, they are mutually exclusive in that section 
6quat(2) specifically stipulates that the relief afforded under section 6quat cannot be used 
in addition to that granted under a DTA. Section 6quat is discussed in more detail at 
paragraph 4.6 below in so far as it may be a viable means of providing relief from double 
taxation to partners of a cross-border partnership. 
 
The existing body of law regarding the application of DTA's to cross-border partnerships 
has recently been somewhat shaken by the delivery of the Grundlingh v CSARS
31
 judgment 
in 2009. This judgment has raised several issues regarding the taxation of cross-border 
partnerships, not least of all being its relation to the Appellate Division decision of CIR v 
Epstein
32
. The comments made regarding partnerships in the Lever Bros judgment also 
seems to conflict with the Grundlingh case. 
 
This chapter will begin the process of reconciling our sources of law into one coherent 
South African approach to the taxation of cross-border partnerships through setting out the 
judgments of Epstein, Lever Bros and Grundlingh. In doing so, it is noted that the Epstein 
and Lever Bros cases were decided before South Africa changed from a source basis to a 
residence basis of taxation, while Grundlingh was decided after this change. The published 
commentaries on these cases will be considered before a reconciliation of the dicta 
espoused in the cases is proposed.  
 
4.2 Consideration of CIR v Epstein 
4.2.1  Judgment 
This judgment centred on determining the source of income earned by a South African 
resident taxpayer in partnership with a non-resident. In terms of this partnership, it was 
agreed that the non-resident partner would find a purchaser for asbestos and lock the 
purchaser in at a certain price through a contract concluded in Argentina. He would then 
notify the taxpayer of the quality & quantity of asbestos required and also which supplier 
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to approach at the agreed price. The taxpayer would arrange with the supplier, and have the 
asbestos shipped to Argentina where it was sold to the purchaser. The profits remaining 
after covering the cost of freight and other costs were split equally between the two 
partners, while losses were also shared equally. The Commissioner sought to tax the 
taxpayer's share of the partnership profits in South Africa. The taxpayer argued that the 
source of the income so earned was not South Africa. At the time of this case, South Africa 
taxed its residents on a source-basis. 
 
The court was divided as to the source of the income. The majority of the court, per 
Centlivres CJ held that the source of the income was in South Africa while the minority 
held that it was in Argentina. In delivering the majority judgment, Centlivres CJ noted that 
all of the taxpayer's activities in respect of this arrangement were carried out in South 
Africa. The court made reference to Millin v CIR
33
 where in that judgement, the court held 
that the source of the royalties earned was where the taxpayer had exercised her wits and 
labour which had produced the royalties. As she had exercised her wits and labour in South 
Africa, the source of the royalties was accordingly in South Africa. 
 
Centlivres CJ held the following: 
 
"Applying what Solomon, C.J., said in Millin’s case – which was not referred to in the 
judgments of the Special Court and the Provincial Division – to the facts of the present case 
there can, in my opinion, be no doubt that the respondent’s profits in connection with his 
dealings in asbestos were received from a source within the Union
34
. He carries on business 
in Johannesburg. He renders no services and spends no money outside the Union in 
connection with his association with Hendrickse and Company and he uses his own banking 
account for the purpose of financing the transactions in respect of asbestos. All of the 
activities of the respondent were carried on in the Union and it was as a result of these 
activities that he earned the profits which the Commissioner now seeks to tax. It therefore 




The minority held a different view. Schreiner JA noted that the present case dealt with the 
taxation of profits of a business. Schreiner JA further noted that what was of importance 
was the place where the business profits were realised, and not where the taxpayer himself 
has personally exerted himself. A business may be carried on through partners or other 
agents. Another important remark made by the minority was that the transactions in both 
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countries were the transactions of both partners, and the income which each received as a 
result of such transactions had to originate in the same place. In determining the location of 
such place, Schreiner examined foreign case law and found that the majority of the cases 
adopted the view that the origin of the profits from the sale of goods was the place where 
the goods were sold. Schreiner JA distinguished Millin v CIR on the basis that Millin was 
not a case of the buying and selling of goods. In agreeing with the view adopted in foreign 
jurisdictions, Schreiner JA held that the source of the profits earned was the place where 
the goods were sold; namely, the Argentine.  
 
4.2.2 Commentary on the Case 
Hahlo (1954:292) commented on the difficulty in following the reasoning of the majority 
of the court. Given that the partnership is not a separate legal entity and the partners are 
assessed individually on their respective share of the partnership profits, the logical 
conclusion must be that the originating cause of the partners' share of the partnership 
profits must be the same as that of the partnership profits (Hahlo, 1954:293).  Hahlo 
(1954:293) notes that the majority recognised this and attempted to address it. The court 
stated that in the case of a partnership consisting of partners operating in two countries, the 
source of the partnership profits is derived from two sources. The source of each partner's 
share of the partnership profits is within the country in which such partner had carried on 
his activities on behalf of the partnership.  
 
Hahlo (1954:293) further commented that the Appellate Division should have followed the 
English decision of Sulley v The Attorney-General
36
, a judgment which had consistently 
been followed for eighty-four years and which was directly in point to the Epstein case. 
The Sulley case dealt with a partnership consisting of partners residing in New York and 
England. The appellant was the partner residing in England. He was charged with the 
purchase of the goods in England which were then shipped to New York to be resold at a 
profit. The court in Sulley held that there was no carrying on of a trade in England, and that 
the partner's principle place of trade in the sense that it was the place where his profits 
came home to him was New York. The majority of the court in Epstein adopted the view 
that Sulley was inapplicable as the case had been decided in terms of an English statute 
while this case was to be decided in terms of section 7 of the ITA. Hahlo (1954:293) takes 
the view that this reasoning is irrelevant to the issue at hand. The differences between the 
                                               











two statutes had no bearing on the issue to be decided in either case (Hahlo, 1954:293). 
The issue in Sulley was exactly the same as the issue to be decided in the Epstein case. 
 
Gillooly (1981:386) also remarked on the difficulty encountered in following the reasoning 
of the majority of the court in Epstein. Gillooly notes that while the Special Court reached 
the decision in ITC 749
37
 that when a Johannesburg accountant ventured to Lourenco 
Marques to conduct an audit he did so as a member of a firm and that the originating cause 
of his income was outside South Africa, the majority of the court in Epstein ventured a 
different path. The conclusion reached by the majority of the court in Epstein, and the 
position of South African law as a result, bears an intrinsic problem in that it requires the 
partner to virtually contract with himself. The partnership is not a separate legal entity. 
Therefore, the partner's share of the partnership profits would essentially be paid to him for 
the services he has rendered to himself as forming part of the partnership (Gillooly, 
1954:386).    
 
4.3 Consideration of CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd  
4.3.1 Judgment 
The decision in CIR v Lever Bros concerned the determination of the source of interest 
income. Lever Bros, an English company, sold some of its assets to a Dutch company for 
£11 million on loan. The Dutch company accordingly became liable to pay the interest on 
such loan. As security for the loan, the Dutch company gave Lever Bros shares in a United 
States company of a value exceeding that of the loan. The shares were lodged with an 
English company acting as a trustee. In March 1939, a South African company was 
formed. All the security shares vested in this South African company, and it duly assumed 
the Dutch company's rights and obligations in terms of the original agreements. Payment 
was moved from Rotterdam to London, and the South African company was to make all 
future payments. The Commissioner sought to tax Levers Bros on this interest received as 
being from a South African source. 
 
Once again the court was split as to the source of the income. The judgment of the majority 
of the court was delivered by Watermeyr CJ while the minority judgment was delivered by 
Schreiner JA. Watermeyr CJ held that the source of receipts was the originating cause of 
                                               











the income being received. This originating cause was the work which the taxpayer does to 
earn the income. In applying this to the case, the court found that the originating cause of 
the interest received by Lever Bros was the provision of credit. More specifically, the court 
held that it was Lever Bros' making and carrying out of the agreement relating to the £11 
million which had earned it the income. While the court failed to make a ruling as to the 
exact location of the originating cause in this case, it did rule that as Lever Bros did not 
conduct any activities of any kind in South Africa the originating cause was most certainly 
not located in South Africa. Schreiner JA adopted a different view to the majority of the 
court. The minority held that the originating cause of the interest was the debt itself. In 
determining the location of such originating cause, the minority found that this was to be 
the residence of the debtor. Accordingly, as the debtor was a South African resident the 
interest was of a South African source.  
 
Of importance for the purposes of this paper is Schreiner JA's comments – albeit obiter 
dicta – regarding the source of a partnership's income. Schreiner JA's remarks as follows: 
 
"In the case of shares it is possible that the shareholder might under some income tax 
statutes be looked upon as a partner in the company’s business, but no one would speak of 
the purchase of his shares as the source of his income any more than one would speak of the 




4.3.2 Commentary on the Case 
The dictum of the Lever Bros case is widely accepted in South African law, and is oft-
quoted. In terms of the ratio decidendi of the judgment, it has been rendered obsolete with 
the introduction of the deemed source provisions of sections 9(6) and 9(7) of the ITA in 
1998.  
 
Section 9(6) of the ITA provides that interest shall be deemed to be of a South African 
source where the interest-bearing borrowed funds are "utilised or applied" or applied in 
South Africa. Section 9(7) of the ITA determines that funds shall be deemed to be "utilised 
or applied" at the place where, in the case of a natural person, the lender is ordinarily 
resident and, in the case of a person other than a natural person, where its place of effective 
management is situated. It is important to note that these deeming provisions do not 
                                               











overrule the true source rules, as set down in the Lever Bros case, but are intended to 
supplement them. The deeming provisions are therefore to be applied once application of 
the true source rules fails to produce a result.    
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment of First National Bank of Southern 
Africa Ltd v CSARS
39
 seems to reject the Lever Bros view regarding the source of interest. 
The taxpayer in this case had access to foreign currency through loans it would make from 
foreign banks interested in lending money to South Africa. The taxpayer's client would 
request foreign currency in its rand equivalent. The client would then obtain the rand 
equivalent of the foreign currency in South Africa through the taxpayer’s treasury account 
in New York. The South African client would then be debited in South Africa, in rand, in 
the books of the taxpayer’s branch at which it was a customer. If the foreign currency was 
paid to the client overseas, or paid out overseas on its behalf, its branch account with the 
taxpayer would be debited with the then rand equivalent and, in addition to the capital of 
the loan, the client would be debited in South African rand with the interest charged by the 
foreign bank together with an added margin on the interest (representing the taxpayer’s 
remuneration or profit) as well as a premium for forward exchange rate cover, if this was 
required. The foreign currency loan was pegged to the foreign currency in question and 
had to be repaid to the taxpayer in New York in that currency on the maturity date. Where 
the client utilised the taxpayer’s services for this purpose, which was usually the case, 
payment was effected by converting the client’s South African rand into the required 
foreign currency in the foreign exchange department at the taxpayer’s head office in South 
Africa and passing the necessary credits by means of appropriate book entries. This 
resulted in the client’s branch account in South Africa being credited in rand with the 
amount repaid and the equivalent foreign currency being transferred to the taxpayer’s 
Chase Manhattan Bank account via its treasury account in New York. The taxpayer argued 
that in terms of the Lever Bros case, the source of the interest was in New York as this was 
determined to be the place where the funds attracting the interest were made available to 
the taxpayer.  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal, however, was of a different opinion. The court held that the 
taxpayer's reliance on the Lever Bros case was misplaced as the facts of the case were 
materially different from that of Lever Bros. Of significance to the court was that all the 
                                               











important factors which caused the interest income to arise (and which constituted the 
dominant cause of the receipt of the interest) had their origin in South Africa and flowed 
from the taxpayer’s business activities and operations in South Africa. The only connection 
with New York was the fact that contractually the foreign currency had been made 
available to the borrowing client in New York and had to be repaid there. The court found 
that the view adopted by the taxpayer was very narrow in that it only focused on where the 
funds had been made available and had to be repaid. The court held that regard would have 
to be had to the essence of the whole transaction which generated the interest with a view 
to determining the location of its source. As such, the source of the interest was South 
Africa when one had regard to the overall factual matrix applicable in this case. 
 
The Lever Bros view on the source or originating cause of interest therefore no longer 
stands as authority in South African law. 
  
4.4 Consideration of Grundlingh v CIR 
4.4.1 Judgment 
The taxpayer in casu was a resident of South Africa and a partner in a law firm established 
in Lesotho. South Africa sought to tax the partnership profits earned by the resident based 
on the residence of the taxpayer, while Lesotho sought to tax the profits on the basis of the 
income being of a source within Lesotho. Lesotho taxes partnerships in the same manner 
as South Africa in that the partnership profits are taxed in the hands of the individual 
partners, and not at the partnership level. An assessment was raised by the Commissioner 
in terms of which the partnership profits were included in the taxpayer's taxable income, 
while a credit was recognised for the taxes paid in Lesotho on the same income. The 
taxpayer objected to this assessment, and sought to invoke the provisions of the 
Lesotho/South Africa DTA to produce a different result.  
 
The parties had agreed that the partnership business constituted a permanent establishment 
in Lesotho. A fixed place of business and office were located in Lesotho. The taxpayer 
argued that Lesotho was granted the sole right to tax the partnership profits in terms of 












"The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State unless 
the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent 
establishment situated therein."  
 
The taxpayer argued that the partnership itself was the 'enterprise of a Contracting State' 
(Lesotho), as contemplated in article 7(1). Accordingly, and as the taxpayer's argument 
went, South Africa was precluded from taxing the taxpayer on the profits of the partnership 
on the basis that the partnership did not have a permanent establishment in South Africa 
and the partnership paid tax in Lesotho. 
 
In analysing this case, it is necessary to consider both the judgments of the Bloemfontein 
Tax Court (ITC 1819
40




4.4.1.1 Tax Court Decision 
The court rejected SARS argument that it was article 14 and not article 7 of the DTA 
which applied in casu. Article 14 relates to the income earned from 'independent personal 
services'. Article 14(2) defines 'independent personal services' as including independent 
scientific, literary, artistic, educational or teaching activities as well as the independent 
activities of physicians, lawyers, engineers, architects, dentists and accountants.  In terms 
of article 14, the state in which the fixed base of a professional person is located would be 
entitled to tax the income attributable to such fixed base, regardless of the right of such 
person's resident state to tax the income. 
 
The court reasoned that when one is dealing with a 'share of profits', as the parties agreed 
was the case here, 'independent services' as is contemplated in article 14 would not feature. 
The court also drew from the manner in which the profit share was calculated that the court 
was not dealing strictly with fee income. This was as the calculation of the profit share did 
not include fees which were attributable to the taxpayer on account of the taxpayer having 
rendered services to a particular client who had duly paid those fees to the partnership. In 
the absence of such attribution, it could not be argued that article 14 was applicable. 
 
                                               
40 ITC 1819 [2007] 69 SATC 159 











On the other hand, the court did not completely find in the taxpayer's favour either. The 
court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the application of article 7 to the facts produced 
the results which the taxpayer sought; namely, his share of partnership profits being 
exempt from tax imposed in South Africa. The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument 
that it was the partnership which was the 'enterprise of a Contracting State' as envisaged in 
article 7(1). The court held that it was only persons who were residents in terms of the 
DTA who would be entitled to the benefits of the DTA. A 'resident' is defined in article 4 
of the Lesotho/South Africa DTA as follows: 
 
"1. For the purposes of this Agreement the term 'resident of a Contracting State' means: 
(a) in Lesotho, any person who, under the laws of Lesotho, is liable to tax therein 
by reason of his residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar 
nature; and 
(b) in South Africa, any individual who is ordinarily resident in South Africa and 
any other person which has its place of effective management in South Africa. 
3. Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph 1 a person other than an 
individual is a resident of both Contracting States, then it shall be deemed to be a 
resident of the State in which its place of effective management is situated." 
 
A South African resident is thus "any individual who is ordinarily resident in South Africa 
and any other person who has its place of effective management in South Africa". It was 
clear that the taxpayer partner was a resident of South Africa. However, the partnership 
was not a resident of Lesotho as it was not liable to tax in Lesotho. It was the individual 
partners of the partnership who were liable to tax in Lesotho. Therefore, for the purposes 
of article 7, it was the partner who was the 'person' who carried on an enterprise in Lesotho 
together with his partners. As such enterprise carried on business in Lesotho through a 
permanent establishment in Lesotho, Lesotho was entitled to tax the profits so generated 
from the permanent establishment. On the other hand, South Africa as the residence state is 
entitled to tax its resident on the profits generated from the partnership in Lesotho. Article 
22 of the DTA would have South Africa provide the taxpayer relief from the double 
taxation through those taxes paid in Lesotho being credited against the taxes due on the 
same income taxed in South Africa. 
 
4.4.1.2 Free State High Court Decision 
The taxpayer appealed against the Tax Court decision to a full bench of the Free State High 











partnership which was the enterprise of Lesotho for the purposes of article 7(1) of the 
DTA, as the lower court had accepted that the partnership carries on its business in Lesotho 
through the taxpayer and the Lesotho resident partners. Also, it must be noted that the 
Commissioner argued its case on the basis that it was entitled to tax the partnership income 
in terms of article 7(1), and in the alternative it relied on article 14.  
 
The court confirmed the lower court's finding that it was the taxpayer partner who was 
liable to tax in Lesotho on his share of the partnership profits. The taxpayer was deemed to 
carry on the business of the partnership. The partnership was not a 'person liable to tax' and 
accordingly was not a resident as defined in the DTA. The court also found that the fact 
that the partnership was required to register for tax purposes in Lesotho, and the fact that 
the partners were required to file a consolidated return in Lesotho did not mean that the 
partnership was liable to tax in Lesotho. The partnership was therefore not entitled to claim 
any relief in terms of the DTA. The court further found that article 7(1) was therefore not 
applicable in casu.  
 
An interesting point is the court's reliance on section 24H of the ITA in coming to such 
conclusion. Both the Tax court and the High court relied on section 24H(2) of the ITA in 
finding that the taxpayer was deemed to carry on the business of the partnership. Thus, the 
profits generated from the partnership were accordingly profits generated from the 
business of the South African resident partner.  
 
4.4.2 Commentary on the Cases 
4.4.2.1 Commentary on ITC 1819 
Gutuza (2008:517) draws into question in her article the court's reliance on section 24H in 
its decision-making. It was commented in her work that section 24H(2) is a deeming 
provision. Therefore, while article 3(2) of most DTA's would entitle the country invoking 
the DTA to attribute its domestic meaning of an undefined term used in the DTA, article 
3(2) does not make reference to the use of a deeming provision found in such domestic 












"(2) Where any trade or business is carried on in partnership, each member of such 
partnership shall, notwithstanding the fact that he may be a limited partner, be deemed for 
the purposes of this Act to be carrying on such trade or business." 
 
Also, article 3(2) reads as follows: 
 
"2. In the application of the provisions of this Agreement by a Contracting State, any term 
not otherwise defined herein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning 
which it has under the laws of that State concerning the taxes which are the subject of this 
Agreement." 
 
She further argues that while the DTA and the ITA should be read together, one must 
consider the fact that the deeming provisions may undermine or affect the application of 
the DTA altogether (2008:518). In support of this statement, she notes that were it not for 
the deeming provision of section 24H(2), the partnership in Lesotho may not necessarily be 
a trade or business carried on by the resident partner – as was the case in CIR v Epstein. 
 
Gutuza (2008:519) further makes the argument in her article that the use of section 24H(2) 
in the manner espoused in ITC 1819 is to use the section out of its context. She argues that 
the purpose of the section is to regulate the tax treatment of partnership income. As the 
section was introduced in response to the Sacks v CIR judgment, it ensures that the taxation 
of the partnership income is not deferred through the income remaining in the partnership 
and not distributed to its partners. Thus, she argues that section 24H(2) should not be used 
beyond its purpose in allowing the partners access to the deductions and allowances which 
would not necessarily have been available to them without such a deeming provision. 
 
4.4.2.2 Commentary on the Grundlingh Case 
Hattingh (2010:45) comments that the judgment contains a basic inaccuracy in the manner 
in which the conclusion was reached by the court. The court held that article 7(1) did not 
apply, and therefore it did not have to deal with article 14. The court further held that the 
Commissioner had been correct in crediting the Lesotho taxes paid by the partner against 
the partner's taxes due in South Africa. Hattingh further notes that this comment made by 
the court may be read as effectively overturning the lower court's judgment that article 7 
did apply. This represents a particular difficulty as article 7 does in fact apply in the 












Hattingh notes that in terms of understanding the application of a DTA, one of the 
distributive rules of the DTA must be applicable to the income before it can be said that an 
obligation arises under the DTA to provide relief from double taxation. Article 7(1) was 
clearly applicable as the taxpayer carried on business in Lesotho through a permanent 
establishment located in that country (Hattingh, 2010:46). Hattingh (2010:47) is 
accordingly of the view that the conclusion reached in ITC 1819 is the correct one. Also, 
the reasoning adopted by this court in determining that article 14 was not applicable is also 
convincing (Hattingh, 2010:47). 
 
4.5 Proposed Reconciliation of Case Law 
It is submitted that because of the introduction of section 24H into the ITA in 1988 the 
majority judgment of Epstein can no longer be applied. The decision in Grundlingh 
therefore represents our law on the issue of the taxation of cross-border partnerships. This 
submission finds support in the view adopted by Olivier (2009) where it was stated that as 
section 24H(2) views the partnership as one business, the minority view expressed by 
Schreiner JA would be more fitting in the new legislative landscape. 
 
In making this submission, it is necessary to consider the criticisms levelled against the 
judgments. 
 
i) Reliance on the Deeming Provision of Section 24H(2) 
Gutuza (2008:517) argues that it is article 3(2) of the DTA which entitles a country to 
make use of its domestic law to interpret the provisions of the DTA. Article 3(2) does not 
seem to encompass deeming provisions of such domestic law (Gutuza, 2008:517).  
 
It is submitted that while article 3(2) does bring domestic law of the country seeking to use 
the DTA into the interpretation of such DTA, section 108 of the ITA does this as well. 
Section 108(2) specifically states that as soon as the procedures in terms of section 231 of 
the Constitution
42
 have been followed and Parliament has approved the DTA, such DTA 
shall have the effect as if it were enacted in terms of the ITA. The DTA would therefore 
                                               











form part of the ITA, and the two should be read as forming one composite whole (Olivier 
& Honiball, 2005:36). As a result, in terms of South African law the provisions of the DTA 
would not bear a special status in relation to domestic provisions (Olivier & Honiball, 
2008:36). Therefore section 24H with its deeming provision of section 24H(2) must be 
read with the DTA, in terms of section 108(2) of the ITA. Section 24H(2) also specifically 
states that partners are to “be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be carrying on such 
trade or business”. 
 
This is confirmed by the following statement in ITC 1544
43
 where it was held that: 
“The effect of s 108(2) of the Act is to grant statutory relief in certain circumstances where 
the South African Act imposes a tax, where the provisions of a double-tax Convention grants 
an immunity or exemption from such tax to persons governed by the Convention.  Tax is not 
payable to the extent to which an immunity or exemption from tax is granted in terms of a 
binding double tax Convention which has been proclaimed and thus has statutory effect.  
Secretary for Inland Revenue v Downing 1975(4) SA 518(A) at 523.  The terms of a double 
tax Convention on which statutory status has been conferred are to be considered as any 
other statutory provisions to determine the extent to which these conflict with the provisions 
of another statute and whether such provisions have been modified thereby.  Ostime 
(Inspector of Taxes) v Australian Provident Society 38 TC 492 at 514(HL); Commissioner 
for Inland Revenue v Collis Dealing Ltd 39 TC 509 at 521(HL).” (Emphasis added) 
 
The current legislative landscape requires one to make use of domestic legislation to 
interpret the provisions of a DTA. Such licence to resort to domestic legislation may be 
found in article 3(2) of the DTA and also section 108(2) of the ITA. These provisions 
make it clear that one cannot ignore domestic law in the interpretation process, and further 
that one may rely on domestic definitions and deeming provisions in such process. 
  
ii) Section 24H(2) used out of its Context 
Gutuza (2008:519) argues that the purpose for the introduction of section 24H(2) of the 
ITA is to allow partners access to the deductions and allowances of the ITA which may not 
otherwise have been available to certain partners in the absence of the express provisions 
of section 24H(2). The section was therefore not meant to be used for the purpose of 
interpreting a DTA with a view to determining which article applied. Gutuza (2008:517) 
further argues that such use may undermine or affect the application of the DTA.  
 
                                               











The concerns of Gutuza were to a certain extent shared by SARS before the introduction of 
section 24H in 1988 (Meyerowitz, 1988:31). SARS was well concerned that the partner en 
commandite would be denied access to the deductions in terms of section 11 of the ITA, 
according to the statement made in the Explanatory Memorandum on the Income Tax Bill, 
1988
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. However, this concern stemmed from the fact that SARS was of the view that the 
partner en commandite cannot be said to be carrying on the business of the partnership 
when our common law prohibited such partner from participating in the business of the 
partnership (Meyerowitz, 1988:31). As a result, SARS believed that it was only the general 
partner who could be said to be carrying on the trade of the partnership (Meyerowitz, 
1988:31). The Explanatory Memorandum (1988:22) states that the purpose for the 
introduction of section 24H(2) is to clarify that a limited partner would be considered to be 
carrying on the business of the partnership, notwithstanding the limitations imposed on 
such partner.  
 
Meyerowitz, however, argues that this provision is unnecessary (1988:31). Meyerowitz 
(1988:31) notes that the partnership consists of a group of persons all carrying on a trade 
for the benefit of all. It was made clear in Bester v Van Niekerk
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 that each partner must 
contribute something towards the partnership and this may be in the form of labour, money 
or skill. From this it is clear that it is not necessary that each partner must contribute labour 
towards the partnership. Accordingl , Meyerowitz (1988:31) argues that there is no 
rational basis on which it can be argued that all of the partners of a partnership where all of 
the partners contribute their labour are carrying on a trade, while other partners who are 
prohibited by law or agreement from participating in the business of the partnership – but 
have well contributed their capital – are not carrying on a trade. In both cases, all of the 
partners bear the risk that the partnership would incur losses – some partners to a lesser 
degree than others – and all would share in the profits realised by the partnership 
(Meyerowitz, 1988:31). There is no doubt therefore that all of the partners would therefore 
be carrying on a trade in respect of that partnership.  
 
It is clear from the above that even in the absence of section 24H(2), a silent partner or 
partner en commandite would be regarded as carrying on a trade in respect of the 
partnership notwithstanding the fact that such partner may be prohibited, in terms of our 
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domestic common law or in terms of the partnership agreement, from participating in the 
partnership business.  Such partners would therefore have access to the allowances and 
deductions of the ITA even in the absence of section 24H(2). Furthermore, given that the 
deeming provision is in fact unnecessary in determining whether a silent partner or partner 
en commandite would be carrying on the business of the partnership, the use of the 
deeming provision in the interpretation of a DTA would not undermine or affect the 
application of a DTA as the position would be the same with or without such deeming 
provision.  
 
iii) Methodology adopted by the courts 
Hattingh (2010:47) proposes the following methodology to be adopted by South African 
courts in future in order to avoid the confusion which seemed to permeate both the ITC 
1819 and Grundlingh judgments.  
 
First, a court must determine how the partnerships are treated in terms of the domestic law 
of the two states (Hattingh, 2010:47). Second, it should be examined whether application 
of the DTA would produce a result different to the one generated from an application of 
the two domestic regimes (Hattingh, 2010:47). In this step, each state would apply the 
provisions of the DTA while using its domestic law to interpret the undefined terms of the 
DTA. It is at this stage when the issue of the taxation of cross-border partnerships becomes 
tricky.  However, it must be borne in mind that from the residence state's perspective, such 
state's interest in the DTA would only be to the extent that the DTA requires it to grant the 
taxpayer relief as the income is taxable in the source state (Hattingh, 2010:49). It is 
therefore required that the residence state agrees that the source state is entitled to tax the 
income in accordance with the DTA (Hattingh, 2010:49). International debate in the form 
of Commentary to the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital could 
assist in resolving the differences which may arise in the two states in respect of the 
classification of the income in terms of the DTA. Certain solutions were proposed by the 
OECD and were discussed under chapter 3 above. In the Grundlingh case, matters were 
simplified by the fact that both Lesotho and South Africa classified the income in the same 
way, and both regimes taxed partnerships in the same manner. Hattingh (2010:50) is of the 
view that following this approach would ensure consistency in the manner in which DTA's 












A consistent approach could also be found in following that proposed by Edwardes-Ker as 
cited by Oliver & Honiball (2008:11). In terms of this approach, the first step would be to 
determine whether domestic law imposes a tax liability on the taxpayer (Olivier & 
Honiball, 2008:11). Should no liability arise, there would be no need to resort to the treaty 
given that no double taxation would exist (Olivier & Honiball, 2008:11). In the event that 
domestic law does impose a tax liability, the next step would be to consider the provisions 
of the DTA to determine which of the two states is entitled to tax the income (Olivier & 
Honiball, 2008:11). Should the treaty not allow the state to tax the income, and despite the 
existence of domestic legislation imposing the tax liability, the state is precluded from 
taxing the income (Olivier & Honiball, 2008:11). In the event that the treaty does entitle 
the state to tax the income, the third step would be to determine whether such treaty 
provision places any limitation on such state's right to tax (Olivier & Honiball, 2008:11).       
  
4.6 Section 6quat and Cross-Border Partnerships 
Section 6quat of the ITA and the relief it could provide becomes particularly relevant when 
one considers that not all countries conclude DTA's. Moreover, DTA's specifically do not 
provide relief from economic double taxation. In this section, a very limited account of the 
provisions of section 6quat in so far as it may apply to cross-border partnerships is 
provided. 
 
The relief section 6quat provides is either in the form of a credit (rebate) or a deduction. 
The mechanics of the credit method is that the foreign taxes paid by the resident taxpayer 
are credited against such taxpayer's tax liability. The deduction method, on the other hand, 
has the foreign taxes paid reducing the taxpayer's taxable income subject to South African 
tax. Usually, it is more beneficial for the foreign taxes to be recognised as a credit rather 
than a deduction under section 6quat as the credit method would have the foreign taxes 
reducing the South African taxes due on a like-for-like basis. Unfortunately, the taxpayer 
does not have a choice whether the foreign taxes paid will be recognised as either a credit 
or a deduction under section 6quat.  
 
Wilson (2005:8) summarises the types of income included in the taxpayer's taxable income 












i) Any income, excluding a foreign dividend, received by or accrued to the 
taxpayer from a non-South African source that is not deemed to be of a 
South African source; 
 
ii) Any part of a CFC's income; 
 
iii) Any foreign dividend; 
 
iv) Any taxable capital gain in so far as it is attributable to a foreign asset 
that is not deemed to be of a South African source; and 
 
v) Any income deemed to be that of the taxpayer's in terms of section 7, 
the attribution rules of the Eighth Schedule, or section 25B of the ITA. 
 
The amount of such rebate is determined under section 6quat(1A) as an amount equal to 
the sum of any taxes on income proved to be payable without any right of recovery (other 
than a right of recovery in terms of any entitlement to carry back losses arising during any 
year of assessment to any prior year of assessment) to the government of the foreign 
country. The rebate is limited under section 6quat(1B) to an amount that does not exceed 
an amount that bears to the total normal tax payable the same ratio as the total taxable 
income attributable to the income derived form the other country bears to the total taxable 
income. Any excess beyond such limit is not lost but is carried forward to the following 
year of assessment.  
 
Foreign taxes payable without a right of recovery by a South African resident on income 
which does not fall into one of the categories listed under section 6quat(1) shall be 
deducted from the resident's taxable income under section 6quat(1C) of the ITA.  
 
It is interesting to note that the proviso to section 6quat(1A) of the ITA provides that in the 
event that the partnership is treated as a separate entity in another state, a proportion of the 











have been paid by such resident partner.  As a result, section 6quat would provide resident 
partners of cross-border partnerships relief from economic double taxation. Section 6quat 
would certainly be of assistance to resident partners in instances where the DTA does not 
apply or where there is no DTA in existence at all.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
With the introduction of section 24H into the ITA in 1988, the taxation of partnerships was 
codified in South Africa. This introduction has also significantly changed the common law 
of the taxation of cross-border partnerships. The Epstein case was the authority on 
determining the source of a partner's share of the partnership profits for over fifty years. 
Despite the inherent difficulties in following the reasoning of the majority, the judgment 
has been applied without fail for a number of years according to our doctrine of stare 
decisis.  
 
It is submitted that the Grundlingh case now reflects the South African position on the 
taxation of cross-border partnerships. It is further submitted that as the Grundlingh case is 
distinguishable from Epstein, the judgment of Epstein was not binding on the High Court 
which decided Grundlingh. Epstein was decided before the introduction of section 24H(2) 
while Grundlingh was decided after the introduction of this section into the ITA. This has 
significantly changed the decision-making matrix used by the court in making its decision 
in Grundlingh. As was stated in the arguments above relating to the reliance on section 
24H(2) in the Grundlingh case, section 24H must be read with the DTA in terms of section 
108(2) of the ITA. As Epstein predated section 24H, it was irrelevant to the issue before 
the court in the Grundlingh case. However, given that the authority of Epstein was 
nonetheless in existence at the time that the Grundlingh judgment was taken, it is 
unfortunate that neither the Tax Court nor the High Court referred to the Epstein judgment 
at all. 
 
The current South African position is that each partner of a partnership is deemed to carry 
on the trade of the partnership in terms of section 24H(2) of the ITA. As each partner is 
carrying on a trade, article 14 of the DTA would not be applicable as it is not personal 
independent services which are rendered by each partner. Instead, each partner is carrying 











generated. Article 7 (business profits) would therefore be of application in determining 
which country of the two countries involved in the cross-border partnership would be 
entitled to tax the partnership profits.  
 
At the same time, it is important to bear the possible relief which section 6quat of the ITA 
may be able to provide resident partners in mind. It would be particularly useful in 
instances where the DTA would not apply, such as in instances of economic double 
taxation, and would be essential where there is no DTA between South Africa and the 
other country.  
 
5 PRACTICAL EXAMPLE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH 
5.1 Circumstances of the Practical Example 
In order to understand the South African approach to the taxation of cross-border 
partnerships, it may be useful to consider a practical example. Example 18 of the 
Partnership Report will be considered and adapted to include a South African resident 
partner. This example is selected as it represents the most common scenario which would 
arise in the taxation of cross-border partnerships in South Africa.  
 
A partnership, P, is established in State P and has a permanent establishment in that state. 
One of the two equal partners of P, X, is a resident of South Africa. State P regards the 
partnership to be a separate legal entity for tax purposes, while South Africa treats the 
partnership as a transparent entity for tax purposes. In year 1, P earns profits of R1 million. 
In year 2, P distributes the profits to the resident partners. In year 2, the partnership 
distributes to resident partner X his share of the partnership profits being an amount of 
R300 000.  
 
Under State P's domestic laws, P is a company and the profits would be taxed in year 1 at 
40% (R400 000). In year 2, a further withholding tax (R30 000) on the distribution to X 
would be imposed (by treating it as a dividend). Under South Africa's domestic law, P is 
fiscally transparent. South Africa would tax X in year 1 on X's 50% share in P's profits 












5.2 OECD Approach 
The following difficulties are raised in the Partnership Report: 
 
i) State P taxes two different events while South Africa (as the other state) 
would only recognise one, as the earning of the profits; 
 
ii) The timing mismatch as a result of State P taxing the distribution in year 2 
while South Africa would impose the tax in year 1; and 
 
iii) The tax levied in State P on the partnership profits would be paid by the 
partnership while the tax levied in South Africa on the same income would be 
paid by the resident partner. 
 
In overcoming these difficulties, the Partnership Report proposes the following approach: 
 
i) The assumption is made that article 7 (business profits) of the model tax 
convention applies; 
 
ii) No double taxation would arise on the distribution of the profits. Such profits 
would only be subject to tax in State P as South Africa only recognises one 
taxable event – the earning of the profits.  
 
iii) South Africa cannot be expected to credit the taxes paid in State P on 
distribution against the taxes in year 2 levied in South Africa on the generation 
of the profits in year 1; 
 
iv) The timing mismatch is now irrelevant; 
 
v) In addressing the fact that the taxes paid on the generation of the profits is paid 











must be applied in that South Africa is obliged in terms of the model tax 
convention to credit the taxes paid by the partnership in State P against the 
taxes due in South Africa by the resident partner on his share of the partnership 
profits. This principle is set out in the Partnership Report as: 
 
"To the extent that State R [South Africa] flows-through the income of the partnership to 
the partners for the purpose of taxing them, it should be consistent and flow-through the 
tax paid by the partnership for the purposes of eliminating double taxation arising from 
its taxation of the partners. In other words, if the corporate status given to the partnership 
by State P is ignored for purposes of taxing the share in the profits, it should likewise be 




This approach has been incorporated in the Commentary on the OECD model tax 
convention at para 69.2 of the Commentary on article 23A and B.  
 
5.3 South African Approach 
From a domestic law perspective, the resident partner would be subject to tax in South 
Africa on his share of the partnership profits generated in State P. The resident partner's 
share of the partnership profits would be allocated to him under section 24H(5)(a) of the 
ITA at the time that such profits are generated. This is while State P would tax the 
partnership on the generation of the profits in year 1 and its distribution in year 2.  
 
In determining South Africa's likely approach to this scenario, it is important to note that 
the Appellate Division in SIR v Downing
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 accepted that the Commentary on the OECD 
model tax convention may be used in interpreting tax treaties. This is despite the fact that 
South Africa is not a member state of the OECD. Olivier and Honiball (2008:33) state that 
this means that the Commentary forms part of South Africa's customary international law. 
As such, and given that South African tax treaties largely following the OECD model tax 
convention, the Commentary would be relevant when a South African court is to interpret 
a provision of a tax treaty to which South Africa is a party. Of course, it must be borne in 
mind that the Commentary would only be relevant for all treaties entered into after the date 
the particular provision was included in the Commentary (Olivier & Honiball, 2008:34).(It 
is the subject of much international debate whether the later Commentary would be 
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The issue of the taxation of cross-border partnerships is a varied and not completely 
resolved debate. From a South African perspective, the following points may be noted in 
determining the South African approach to the taxation of cross-border partnerships: 
 
i) The Grundlingh judgment is the authority on the taxation of international 
partnerships in so far as it determines that it is business profits which are 
generated by the partners of the partnership, and not income arising from the 
rendering of independent personal services.  
 
ii) Each partner of a partnership is deemed to carry on the trade of the partnership 
in terms of section 24H(2) of the ITA. This is even though South African 
common law has each of the partners carrying on the business of the 
partnership provided they had each made a contribution to such partnership. As 
each partner is carrying on a trade, article 14 of the DTA would not be 
applicable as it is not personal independent services which are rendered by each 
partner. Instead, each partner is carrying on the business of the partnership from 
which it is expected that business profits would be generated. Article 7 
(business profits) would therefore be of application in determining which 
country of the two or more countries involved in the cross-border partnership 
would be entitled to tax the partnership profits. 
  
iii) The approach South African courts are to adopt in dealing with the 
interpretation of treaties as proposed by Hattingh has merit. In terms of this 
approach, a court should first determine how the partnerships are treated in 
terms of the domestic law of the two states (Hattingh, 2010:47). Second, the 
court should determine whether the application of the DTA would produce a 
different result from that of the domestic regimes of the two states (Hattingh, 
2010:47). In this step, each State would apply the provisions of the DTA while 











domestic legislation of either state not impose a tax liability, there would be no 
need to resort to the DTA. In the event that both states impose a liability, the 
DTA would have to be applied to determine which state is entitled to tax the 
income.  
 
iv) In the event that the two states differ in their classification of the income, South 
Africa should follow the international view in adhering to the approach 
proposed in the Partnership Report. This is as section 233 of the Constitution 
places an obligation on the court to prefer any reasonable interpretation that is 
consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is 
inconsistent with international law (Olivier, 2008:32). The international 
approach to the resolution of conflicts in the classification of income may be 
found in the approach adopted by the OECD in its Commentary on articles 23A 
and B, as discussed at paragraph 3.3 above. Although many commentators have 
expressed their views on this approach, the OECD approach nonetheless 
represents the view of the majority of states as most states follow and apply the 
OECD model tax convention and the Commentary thereon. From a South 
African perspective, Olivier and Honiball (2008:42) note that South African 
courts have in the past rec gnised and applied the OECD Commentary. 
Therefore, in the event that South Africa is the residence state, South Africa 
would be obliged to grant the relief from double taxation under article 23, in 
terms of the Commentary on article 23A and B, notwithstanding the fact that 
South Africa may be of the view that the source state's classification of the 
income is incorrect.  
 
v) It has yet to be seen whether the Partnership Report's proposal will continue to 
be the only viable solution to the partnership classification of income issues, or 
whether we will see the OECD adhering to the calls of the international 
commentators to provide solutions in the provisions of the model convention 
itself, and not merely in the Commentary thereto.  
 
vi) Finally, the provisions of section 6quat should not be overlooked in the resident 











the application of a DTA, and would be essential in instances where South 
Africa does not have a DTA with the other state involved.  
 
At this point, the South African tax treatment of cross-border partnerships is in keeping 
with the approach adopted by the international community. Much uncertainty exists in this 
field, and one may expect further developments proposed with a view to providing a more 
consistent approach across the globe. Given the international scope of this area, it is hoped 
that the OECD makes further strides in removing the cross-border inconsistency which 














Annual Survey of S.A. Law Annual Survey of South African Law Cape Town Juta 
1955 
GITC Review Gray's Inn Tax Chambers Review London Gray's Inn 
Tax Chambers 2001 
SALJ     South African Law Journal Cape Town Juta 1901  
TSAR Tydskrif vir Suid-Afrikaanse Reg Faculty of Law Rand 
Afrikaans University of Cape Town Juta 1976 
 
Ault H.J. 2002. Issues Related to the Identification and Characteristics of the Taxpayer. 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation. 56:263-264. 
Baker P. 2002. The Application of the Convention to Partnerships, Trusts and Other, Non-
Corporate Entities. GITC Review. 2(1):1-31. 
Barenfeld J. 2005. Taxation of Cross-Border Partnerships. Amsterdam: IBFD. 
Daniels A.H.M. 1991. Issues in International Partnership Taxation with special reference 
to the United States, Germany and the Netherlands. Netherlands: Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers. 
De Swart R. 2008. Partnerships. In Silke: South African Income Tax 2009. Stiglingh M. Ed. 
Durban: LexisNexis. 381 – 393. 
Edwardes-Ker M. 1994. Tax Treaty Interpretation. In The International Tax Treaty 
Service. Athlone: Alpha Print. Quoted in Olivier L., & Honiball M. 2008. 
International Tax A South African Perspective. 4
th
 ed. Cape Town: Siber Ink. 
Gillooly T. 1981. The Taxation of Partners. De Rebus. 383-395. 
Gutuza T. 2008. Taxing the Partner of a Foreign Partnership. SALJ. 125(3):514-520.  
Hahlo H.R. Ed. 1954. Taxation. Annual Survey of S.A. Law. 292-293. 
Hattingh J. 2010. The Tax Treatment of Cross-Border Partnerships under Model-Based 
Tax Treaties: Some Lessons From Grundlingh v The Commissioner for the South 











Henning  J.J. 2006. Partnership. In The Law of South Africa. 2
nd
 ed. Joubert W.A. Ed. et al. 
Durban: Butterworths. 19:177-286. 
Jones J.A. and others. 2002. Characterisation of Other States' Partnerships for Income Tax. 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation. 56:288-320. 
Jones J.A. 2002. The Relationship between Domestic Tax Systems and Tax Treaties. 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation. 56:268-270. 
Lang M. 2000. The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships: A 
Critical Analysis of the Report Prepared by the OECD Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs. Netherlands: Kluwer Law International. 
Meyerowitz D., Meyerowitz P. & Davis D.M. 1988. Editorial: Closing More Doors. The 
Taxpayer. 37:21-31. 
Neves T., Russo A. & Zanotti E. 2008. A Case on Partnerships: The Rouquier et Rivay 
Decision of the Belgian Supreme Court. In A Decade of Case Law: Essays in 
honour of the 10
th
 anniversary of the Leiden Adv LLM in International Tax Law. 
Russo R., & Fontana R. Ed. Amsterdam: IBFD. 169-185.  
OECD. 1999. The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships. Issues 
in International Taxation No. 6. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
OECD. 2008. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed 
Version – 2008. Amsterdam: IBFD. 
Olivier L. Ed. 2009 Commentary on Income Tax Act. [Online] Available: 
http://ipproducts.jutalaw.co.za/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&vid=
Publish:10.1048/Enu [2010, June 6]. 
Olivier L., & Honiball M. 2008. International Tax A South African Perspective. 4
th
 ed. 
Cape Town: Siber Ink. 
Quaghebeur M. 2005. Belgium Exempts Dividends Paid by French Property Investment 
Partnership. Tax Notes International. 865-866. 
Rust A. 2003. The New Approach to Qualification Conflicts has its Limits. Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation. 57:45-50. 
Schaffner J. 2000. The OECD Report on the Application of Tax Treaties to Partnerships. 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation. 54:218-226. 











Zaaiman S. 2008. Paragraph (b) of the definition of a company: Anomalies arising in 
respect of certain foreign incorporated entities. KPMG International Tax Monthly 
Update. 12:4-7.  
 
Cases 
Bester v Van Niekerk [1960] (2) SA 779 (AD) 
Chipkin (Natal) (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2005] 67 
SATC 243  
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Delfos [1933] AD 242 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Epstein [1954] 19 SATC 221  
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd [1946] 14 SATC 1  
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Peoples Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd [1990] (2) SA 
353 (A) 
Dickenson v Gross 137 L.T. 351 
First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Commissioner for South African Revenue 
Service [2002] 64 SATC 245 
Grundlingh v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service [2009] 72 SATC 1 
Hoheisen v Commissioner for Inland Revenue [1931] 5 SATC 207  CPD 
Income Tax Case No 248 [1932] 6 SATC 382 (U) 
Income Tax Case No 315 [1934] 8 SATC 163 (U) 
Income Tax Case No 749 [1952]18 SATC 319 
Income Tax Case No 1083 [1966] 28 SATC 157  
Income Tax Case No 1544 [1992]  54 SATC 456 
Joubert v Tarry and Co [1915] TPD 277 
Lategan v Commissioner for Inland Revenue [1926] 2 SATC 16 
Millin v Commissioner Inland Revenue [1928] 3 SATC 170 
R v Levy & others [1929] AD 312 











Rouquier et Rivay, Cass. 2 December (2004), T.F.R. 2006/304 
SA Diebold Courtage (with translation) (1999) 2 ITLR 365 
Sacks v Commissioner for Inland Revenue [1946] 13 SATC 343 
Secretary for Inland Revenue v Downing [1975] 37 SATC 249 
Sulley v The Attorney-General (1860) 5 H. & N. 711; 2 T.C. 149 
 
Legislation 
Attorneys Act, No. 53 of 1979 
Close Corporations Act, No. 69 of 1984 
Companies Act, No. 61 of 1973 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996 
Explanatory Memorandum on the Income Tax Bill, 1988 
Income Tax Act, No. 58 of 1962 
